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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, much attention has been paid to the wars in Iraq, Af-
ghanistan, and Syria, and the nuclear ambitions of Iran. Wars and breaches
of the peace are of paramount importance and thus are rightly matters of
international and national concern. But there are other forces at work,
perhaps less conspicuous but nonetheless debilitating to the United States
and the dollar-based international system, that merit more attention. The
dollar’s role in the international economic system and its valuation remain,
as a former head of the German Bundesbank called it, “a riddle inside an
enigma.”1 And as John Connally, Secretary of Treasury under President
Nixon declared to the world, “the dollar is our currency but your
problem.”2
The dollar and the international monetary system have been inextrica-
bly intertwined. The Bretton Woods system was created by the United
States after World War II and reflects American domination. Dollar he-
gemony has been part and parcel of American economic and military
power. Although the U.S. economy seems to have emerged strong from
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the 2008 financial crisis, serious fault lines exist under the American-domi-
nated international economic system. Whether dollar hegemony can con-
tinue despite economic volatility or whether it is being eroded and more
worryingly, undermined and attacked, by internal and external forces, is
one of the main issues examined in this Article.
What does dollar hegemony mean? When I was a child in South Viet-
nam, my mother hid gold bars and U.S. dollars in a safe because everyone
knew that the dollar was as good as gold; it is also lighter and easier to
carry than gold bars. When the Communists entered Saigon after South
Vietnam collapsed in 1975, they went house to house, hammering open
brick walls in search of hidden dollars.
Americans and other individuals carrying the U.S. dollar can rely on
its privileged status when traveling abroad. That the U.S. dollar is ac-
cepted worldwide not just by banks and hotels but also by local small busi-
nesses and street peddlers is a reflection of international trust in the U.S.
dollar. Moreover, in international business, the dollar is the top dog cur-
rency because importers and exporters settle their transactions in dollars,
even when the underlying imports and exports have no territorial connec-
tion to the United States. As Kishore Mahbubani suggests, “Americans
can purchase products at a marginally cheaper rate than other nations,
which must exchange their currency with each purchase and pay a transac-
tion cost.”3
For example, more than 80 percent of the trade between South Korea
and Thailand is set in dollars, even though only 20 percent of their exports
are destined for the United States.4 Although less than 6 percent of Aus-
tralia’s exports go to the United States, 70 percent are invoiced in dollars.
Oil (and other commodities) is priced in dollars,5 requiring countries that
are oil consumers to accumulate dollars to pay for oil–mostly by exporting
their goods and services to receive dollars as payment.6
Oil producing countries with excess dollar profits invest them in U.S.
debt securities held in Western or U.S. banks. Half of international debt
securities are in dollars.7 And when central banks hold foreign currency
3. KISHORE MAHBUBANI, THE GREAT CONVERGENCE: ASIA, THE WEST, AND THE
LOGIC OF ONE WORLD 71 (2014) (citation omitted).
4. BARRY EICHENGREEN, EXORBITANT PRIVILEGE 2 (2011). This means that a Thai
company exporting to South Korea receiving payments in dollars incurs an additional cost of
converting those dollars into the Thai baht, the currency it uses to pay its workers and
purchase its materials. But a U.S. exporter receives payment in the same currency (the dol-
lar) that it also uses to pay its own workers, managers, suppliers, shareholders.
5. See generally DAVID E. SPIRO, THE HIDDEN HAND OF AMERICAN HEGEMONY,
PETRODOLLAR RECYCLING AND INTERNATIONAL MARKETS (1999).
6. By contrast, the United States itself is able to purchase oil or any other commodi-
ties and products it wishes with the requisite currency–the dollar–simply by printing.
7. Similarly, a Swiss bank accepts deposits in Swiss francs. When it makes foreign
loans, it does so in dollars and would need to worry about exchange rate moves. If the dollar
depreciates against the franc, the value of its assets (its loans) goes down relative to its liabili-
ties (its deposits). EICHENGREEN, supra note 4, at 3. Of course, the Swiss bank can “protect
itself by buying a forward contract that converts the receipts on its dollar loan into francs
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reserves, more than sixty percent of such reserves are dollars. The world’s
central banks also “hold close to $5 trillion of the bonds of the U.S. trea-
sury and quasi-governmental agencies like Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac,”8 and because they continue to desire these dollar securities, they
are willing to pay more to hold them. As a result, the interest rate the
United States has to provide on these securities is relatively low. This al-
lows Americans to have “access to a vast supply of credit and permit[s] the
public to borrow at lower interest rates for homes and automobiles and
the government to finance larger deficits longer and at lower interest
rates.”9 This in turns allows U.S. households to live beyond their means;
indeed, this state of affairs means that ironically, “poor households in the
developing world ended up subsidizing rich ones in the United States.”10
And despite the havoc wreaked by the 2008 financial crisis, the world
nonetheless continued to turn to the dollar because it deemed the U.S.
currency a safe haven in a world of financial turbulence.  Even in 2008,
when the world was gripped by the most debilitating financial crisis in
more than eighty years, the U.S. federal government was still able to bor-
row at low interest rates because foreigners believed the dollar to be a safe
haven currency amidst a world of great turmoil.11
Although it only costs a few cents for the U.S. government to print a
$100 bill, other countries have to provide added value in the form of goods
or services in order to receive $100 dollars. Approximately $500 billion of
U.S. currency circulates outside the United States which foreigners ac-
quired, not because their governments printed the dollars but because
they had had to provide the United States with $500 billion of actual goods
and services.
This privileged position of the dollar is not intrinsic nor inevitable but
is rather a reflection of U.S. domination and conversely, international trust
in U.S. stewardship of the dollar and the dollar-based system. But even
U.S. allies, such as France’s Charles De Gaulle, have complained about
the dollar’s unique status. His finance minister, Valery Giscard d’Estaing,
grumpily called it an “exorbitant privilege” available to no other coun-
try.12 This privilege might have made sense after World War II when the
United States was the undisputed superpower, the largest importer, the
primary source of trade credit and the leading source of foreign capital.13
When central banks around the world needed to stabilize their currencies
when the loan matures, at a rate agreed when the loan is made.” Id. But this means incurring
additional transactions costs that U.S. banks are spared.
8. EICHENGREEN, supra note 4, at 4.
9. See MAHBUBANI, supra note 3, at 72. See also Liam Halligan, The Dollar’s 70-year
Dominance Is Coming to An End, THE TELEGRAPH, July 19, 2014, http://www.telegraph
.co.uk/finance/comment/liamhalligan/10978178/The-dollars-70-year-dominance-is-coming-to-
an-end.html [hereinafter Halligan, The Dollar’s Dominance].
10. EICHENGREEN, supra note 4, at 5.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id. at 2.
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against the dollar, it also made sense for those banks to hold dollars in
reserve.14
But in today’s world, both Chinese and German exports exceeded
U.S. exports, with the American share of global exports only 13 percent.
The United States accounts for less than 20 percent of foreign direct in-
vestment in recent years, compared to a high of 85 percent between 1945
and 198015. This diminished economic position of the United States can
certainly be viewed in benign terms – it is rightfully due to the welcomed
economic progress of others, including, for example, Europe, Japan,
China, and India.
But the criticism has become more vociferous for other reasons as
well. The pressure on the dollar, needed but unloved by the world,16 has
been building and will erupt at some point. Simply put, the dollar has not
been backed by gold or convertible into gold since 197117 when the U.S.
unilaterally ended its post-World War II dollar-gold conversion commit-
ment. It is simply paper money issued by the U.S. government. Yet, “U.S.
economic dominance was so assured that even after President Nixon re-
neged on the dollar’s previously unshakeable convertibility into gold,
amounting to a massive default, dollar demand kept growing.”18
Other countries also question the fairness of a system that facilitates
the establishment of one country’s currency as the international reserve
currency for all countries. Consequently, they also resent the unfair bene-
fits accrued to the United States as a result of this system. For example,
they “question whether the U.S. should have been permitted to run cur-
rent account deficits approaching 6 percent of GDP in the run-up to the
crisis [of 2008].”19 They question why the United States does not have to
“worry about balance of payments crises as it can pay for imports in dol-
lars the Federal Reserve can just print.”20 Emerging economies in particu-
lar complain that when their central banks accumulate dollar reserves to
finance the expansion of their economies, they were, in effect, providing
cheap finance for the persistent U.S. external deficit.
For years, in the face of Soviet threat, Europe, Japan, and the oil ex-
porting countries depended on the United States for their national security
and thus were willing, indeed, were expected, to line up and defend the
dollar when called upon by their American protector. But things have
changed. More and more critics have complained that the United States
“has not been a worthy steward of an international currency . . .”21 be-
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See generally RONALD I. MCKINNON, THE UNLOVED DOLLAR STANDARD: FROM
BRETTON WOODS TO THE RISE OF CHINA (2012).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 183–86. Under the Bretton Woods system, the
United States undertook to convert dollars into gold upon demand at $35 per ounce of gold.
18. Halligan, The Dollar’s Dominance, supra note 9.
19. EICHENGREEN, supra note 4, at 5.
20. Halligan, The Dollar’s Dominance, supra note 9.
21. EICHENGREEN, supra note 4, at 6.
Fall 2016] Currency Wars 61
cause of its heavy debt and chronic budget deficits. There is a vigorous
debate about debt, particularly government debt and what is acceptable
and constructive versus what is excessive and destructive.22
Moreover, financial, not just military tools are becoming powerful
weapons in this economically interdependent and multipolar world. One
surefire way of undermining a country’s economy is to go after its cur-
rency. In 2013, the Xinhua News Agency, China’s state press agency, is-
sued the following denunciation of the United States “[I]nstead of
honoring its duties as a responsible leading power, a self-serving Washing-
ton has abused its superpower status and introduced even more chaos into
the world by shifting financial risks overseas . . . .”23 The solution for an
international system hostage to U.S. domination and abuse: “the introduc-
tion of a new international reserve currency that is to be created to replace
the dominant U.S. dollar . . . .”24 That is an explicit challenge to the dollar
and the dollar-based system.
Critics contend that it is not only that China and other countries might
see the United States as irresponsible. Rather, it is also that they are con-
cluding that the system itself–global and multipolar economically yet na-
tional and unipolar monetarily–is becoming unstable and even
unsustainable. Such systemic internal stress was severely compounded by
external stress posed by “the 2008 financial crisis . . . [which] highlighted
the financial fragility of the U.S. while underscoring the strength of emerg-
ing markets.”25
In response to the impending crash and fear of severe deflation fol-
lowing Lehman Brothers’ collapse,26 the U.S. Federal Reserve (the “Fed”)
since 2008 has printed over $3 trillion of new money.27 Although the polit-
ical limits of frenetic dollar printing may not have been reached as far as
22. For sources discussing the danger of increased debt, see KWASI KWARTENG, WAR
AND GOLD: A FIVE-HUNDRED-YEAR HISTORY OF EMPIRES, ADVENTURES, AND DEBT 5-6
(2014); Carmen Reinhart & Kenneth Rogoff, Growth in a Time of Debt, 100 AM. ECON.
REV. 573 (2010); Carmen M. Reinhart, Vincent R. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Public
Debt Overhangs: Advanced-Economy Episodes Since 1800, 26 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 69
(2012). For skeptics, see Paul Krugman, The Excel Depression, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2013;
Thomas Herndon, Michael Ash & Robert Pollin, Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle
Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart and Rogoff, (Pol. Econ. Research Inst., University
of Massachusetts Amherst, Working Paper No. 322, 2013).
23. Liu Chang, Commentary: U.S. Fiscal Failure Warrants a De-Americanized World,
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Oct. 10, 2013, 9:57 AM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth
/2013-10/13/c_132794246.htm.
24. Id.
25. EICHENGREEN, supra note 4, at 150.
26. Deflation is a general decline in prices caused by a reduction in money or credit.
When cash is scarce and more valuable, businesses and people hoard and save rather than
invest, crushing aggregate demand and causing GDP to plunge. Deflation can be caused by a
decrease in spending, government or personal, or investment. Declining prices can lead to a
downward spiral–declining profits, factory closure, increasing unemployment, declining in-
comes, and defaults on loans by businesses and individuals.
27. JAMES RICKARDS, THE DEATH OF MONEY 10 (2014) [hereinafter RICKARDS,
DEATH OF MONEY].
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the United States is concerned, as discussed later in this Article, this kind
of dollar printing has created dangerous cracks in the international mone-
tary system, with countries such as China, Russia and others waiting in the
wings to exploit U.S. monetary instability.
It might seem anachronistic to write about dollar troubles when the
dollar is currently strong (as of October 2016) or to warn about profound
challenges posed by China and others to the dollar-based system when
China’s economy seems to be decelerating. Despite its weakening econ-
omy and stock market plunge in late 2015 and early 2016, China remains
the world’s second largest economy with annual growth of 7 percent and
impressive employment figures resulting from China’s mostly smooth tran-
sition from a manufacturing to a more service-oriented economy.28 More-
over, the sudden yuan devaluation in August 2015 was not a sign of
Chinese weakness but actually “a point-blank, double-barreled shotgun
blast aimed at U.S. markets.”29 Pressured for years by the United States to
stop devaluing the yuan because a devalued yuan makes Chinese exports
cheaper and more competitive against American products, China’s 2015
devaluation could not be faulted because it was ostensibly made under the
cover of market forces – China could claim it was playing by free market
rules in order to prepare the yuan for inclusion into the basket of world
money called Special Drawing Rights (SDR) managed by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF).
The international economic picture is evolving in complex ways. The
purpose of the article is to connect the dots, look at long-term trends, and
warn about fundamental fault lines and global headwinds that are not im-
mediately obvious–all the more necessary when the economic snapshot of
U.S. markets, and relatedly of the dollar, may appear more rosy than it
should be.
In a highly influential book, Unrestricted Warfare, written by two Chi-
nese military leaders and published by The People’s Liberation Army of
China, the authors observed that even countries with “the dual advantages
of money and technology” have been unable to challenge U.S. domina-
tion.30 They suggested:
[A] breakthrough in our thinking can open up the domain of the
weapons kingdom at one stroke. As we see it, a single man-made
stock-market crash, a single computer virus invasion, or a single
rumor or scandal that results in a fluctuation in the enemy coun-
try’s exchange rates or exposes the leaders of an enemy country
28. Peter Eavis, China’s Economic Turmoil Sends Ripples to Global Markets, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/08/business/dealbook/chinas-economic
-turmoil-sends-ripples-to-global-markets.html.
29. James Rickards, China Destroys the August Myth, DAILY RECKONING (Aug. 14,
2015), http://dailyreckoning.com/china-destroys-the-august-myth/.
30. COLONEL QIAO LANG & COLONEL WANG XIANGSUI, UNRESTRICTED WARFARE
15 (1999), http://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf.
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on the Internet, all can be included in the ranks of new-concept
weapons.31
As these authors noted in a colorfully worded chapter called “The
War God’s Face Has Become Indistinct,” the cause of the debilitating 1997
East Asian currency crisis was “[a] surprise financial war attack that was
deliberately planned and initiated by the owners of international mobile
capital [which] ultimately served to pin one nation after another to the
ground – nations that not long ago were hailed as ‘little tigers’ and ‘little
dragons.’”32 From this perspective, the 1997 Asian currency crisis, accom-
panied by riots and bloodshed from Thailand and Indonesia to South Ko-
rea, looked like a Western plot to destabilize the Asian economies. Then
Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad of Malaysia lashed out at the cur-
rency speculator George Soros and blamed international speculators for
“the attempts to push us back by a decade through forced devaluation of
our currency, through the rape of our share market.”33
The 1997 Asian economic crisis made an indelible impression on
China and brought to the forefront the possibility of financial calamity
unleashed by currency crises. The authors warned that,
financial war is a form of non-military warfare which is just as
terribly destructive as a bloody war, but in which no blood is actu-
ally shed. Financial warfare has now officially come to war’s
center stage. . . . The main protagonist in this section of the history
book will not be a statesman or a military strategist; rather, it will
be George Soros.34
Any attack on the dollar, via massive foreign sell-off of U.S. securities,
for example, would drive up interest rates for the U.S. government as well
as for everyday Americans (because higher interest rates would be needed
to entice people, domestic and abroad, to buy otherwise less desirable se-
curities). Yet, although this possibility and other developments have
eroded the efficacy of the post-World War II dollar-based system and
threatened to cause significant damage to U.S. national interests, they
have occurred without much critical analysis in the international law
literature.
To be clear, certain incidents have been noted but few have connected
the dots to present a full picture. For example, in the past ten years, as I
explain below, certain developments have been reported, but as separate
rather than as a connected accumulation of instances that together, point
to the imminence of global financial instability and the increasing reliance
31. Id. at 25.
32. Id. at 51. See also Steven Vines, “Unscrupulous” Soros Fires a Broadside at
Mahathir the “Menace,” THE INDEPENDENT (Sept. 22, 1997), http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/business/unscrupulous-soros-fires-a-broadside-at-mahathir-the-menace-1240660.html.
33. Alan Friedman, Soros Calls Mahathir a ‘Menace’ to Malaysia, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
22, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/22/news/22iht-soros.t.html.
34. LANG & XIANGSUI, supra note 30, at 51-52.
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by many countries on financial warfare instead of traditional use of force.
The search for control of natural resources, gold, silver, commodities and
something of value is all the more important when what the post-Bretton
Woods system considers of value–paper money–is becoming increasingly
abundant, freely printed by governments operating on chronic deficits.
Note the following examples. On October 28, 2008, RIA Novosti, one
of the largest news agencies in Russia, reported that Russian Prime Minis-
ter Vladimir Putin proposed that Russia and China switch to national cur-
rency payments, instead of the U.S. dollar, when engaged in bilateral
trade.35 On November 15, 2008, Reuters covered Iranian conversion of
financial reserves into gold,36 while four days later, various news outlets
reported that the central bank of China was considering raising its gold
reserves by 4000 metric tons from 600 tons to diversify dollar risk.37 Five
years later, China determined that its gold reserves should be further in-
creased to “ensure national economic and financial safety, promote yuan
globalization i.e., the renminbi as reserve currency and as a hedge against
foreign-reserve risks i.e., a dollar meltdown,” according to Gao Wei, an
official from the Chinese Department of International Economic Affairs
of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.38 On March 23, 2009, without referring ex-
plicitly to the dollar, the Governor of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC)
called for “an international reserve currency that is disconnected from in-
dividual nations and is able to remain stable in the long run . . . .”39 Over a
span of five years, countries such as China, Brazil, India, Mexico, Japan,
South Korea, Iran, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates have not only
quietly increased their gold holding but have also engaged in currency
swap agreements in which they agreed to use each other’s currencies in
35. PM Putin Suggests Russia, China Ditch Dollar in Trade Deals, RIA NOVOSTI (Oct.
28, 2008), http://en.ria.ru/russia/20081028/117991229.html (statement of Vladimir Putin) (“We
should consider improving the payment system for bilateral trade, including by gradually
adopting a broader use of national currencies.”).
36. Fredrik Dahl, Iran Switches Reserves to Gold, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2008, 3:14 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/11/15/us-iran-gold-idUSTRE4AE1F820081115.
37. China PBOC Mulls Raising Gold Reserve By 4,000 Tons, FXSTREET (Nov. 19,
2008), https://www.fxstreet.com/news/82afe43d-8d3c-494d-894d-113c196ed750; Dan Popescu,
China’s Gold Reserves Updated: Surprised?, GOLD BROKER (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.
goldbroker.com/news/china-gold-reserves-updated-surprised-824; see also World Gold Coun-
cil, China Gold Report: Gold in the Year of the Tiger 50 (Apr. 2010) http://www.exchange-
tradedgold.com/media/ETG/file/WOR5797_Gold_Invest_Report_China_Web.pdf (the State
Council advisor Ji Xiaonan suggested that China should invest in 1,000 tons of gold each
year, with a goal of achieving 6,000 tons in three to five years and 10,000 tons in eight to ten
years).
38. Jeff Nielson, China Puts Gold Where Its Money Is, THE STREET (May 3, 2013),
http://www.thestreet.com/story/11913810/1/china-puts-gold-where-its-money-is.html.
39. China Eyes SDR as Global Currency, CHINA DAILY (Mar. 23, 2009), http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2009-03/23/content_7607627.htm; see also Zhou Xiaochuan,
Zhou Xiaochuan’s Statement on Reforming the International Monetary System, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.cfr.org/china/zhio-xiaochuans-statement-reform
ing-international-monetary-system/p18916 (proposing a “super-sovereign reserve currency
managed by a global institution”).
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bilateral or regional trade. In yet another type of deal, countries also
agreed to engage in a barter system–Iranian oil for Chinese goods.40
Against this background, two developments are particularly important
because they show the beginning of the erosion of dollar hegemony. First,
note the concerted actions by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Af-
rica (BRICS) to pursue a dollar-alternative path, most notably the estab-
lishment by BRICS of a New Development Bank (NDB) as a rival to the
Western-dominated Bretton Woods system.41And second, take as an ex-
ample the historic gas deal worth 400 billion, between Russia and China,
concluded after ten years of negotiations, to provide the world’s fastest
growing economy with the natural gas it needs for the next thirty years,42
most likely to be transacted in yuan, not dollars, undercutting both the
primacy of the U.S. dollar as the top dog currency used in oil trades and its
role as the international reserve currency.43
These are not random developments. Despite apparent signs of
strength–depending on when a financial snapshot is taken–the dollar-
based system and indeed, the dollar itself, are increasingly challenged. In a
world of fiat money,44 massive dollar printing via Quantitative Easing
(QE)45 by the Fed since the 2008 crisis has had enormous consequences
40. See Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Anna Fifield & Leslie Hook, China and Iran Plan Oil
Barter, FIN. TIMES (July 25, 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2082e954-b604-11e0-8bed-00144
feabdc0.html#ixzz1T8N4nYws. Although the deal was precipitated by U.S. sanctions against
Iran, which have blocked China from paying at least $20 billion for oil, it has nonetheless
resulted in the dollar being bypassed.
41. This is in addition to China’s formation of a China-led Asian Infrastructure Invest-
ment Development Bank (AIID), which, combined with the BRICS Bank, poses a challenge
to the World Bank and the IMF. Lawrence Summers, Secretary of the Treasury under Presi-
dent Clinton, characterized the founding of the AIID “as the moment the United States lost
its role as the underwriter of the global economic system.” Lawrence Summers, Editorial,
Time U.S. Leadership Woke up to New Economic Era, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2015), http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/a0a01306-d887-11e4-ba53-00144feab7de.html#axzz3msNDL2Ml. Ac-
cording to Summers, there has been “no event since Bretton Woods comparable to the com-
bination of China’s effort to establish a major new institution and the failure of the U.S. to
persuade dozens of its traditional allies, starting with Britain, to stay out of it.” Id.
42. Russia and China Agree 400 Billion Natural Gas Supply Deal, THE GUARDIAN
(May 23, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/may/23/russia-china-agree-gas-
supply-chain.
43. Matt Clinch, What Russia China Relations Mean for the Dollar, CNBC: CURREN-
CIES (May 27, 2014), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101705303 [hereinafter Clinch, Russia-China
Relations].
44. Fiat money is money whose value is derived from government decree or regula-
tion. By contrast, commodity money is based on the value of the commodity itself, such as
gold or silver, which has other uses besides use as a medium of exchange. See JOHN MAY-
NARD KEYNES, The Classification of Money, in A TREATISE ON MONEY 7 (1930); see also N.
GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 659 (5th ed. 2008) (“Fiat money, such as
paper dollars, is money without intrinsic value: It would be worthless if it were not used as
money.”).
45. Quantitative easing is a monetary policy used by the Federal Reserve to purchase
government and other securities. The Federal Reserve creates new money, increases the
money supply, and lowers interest rates. By putting more money into the financial system, it
is hoped banks will lend it to consumers and businesses to jumpstart the economy and avoid
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for the United States and the rest of the world.46 Briefly, QE is a policy
used by central banks such as the Fed to create new money which is then
used by the government to buy assets and spur economic recovery and
growth. First, countries that have held dollars as reserves worry about the
value of their dollar holdings when Fed floods the market with dollars.
The devaluation of the dollar during QE has resulted in the overvaluation
of other currencies–Brazil’s currency, the real, for example, rose to a ten-
month high against the dollar in 2010, prompting Brazil’s Finance Minister
to declare that “[w]e’re in the midst of an international currency war. This
threatens us because it takes away our competitiveness.”47 Indeed, be-
cause most countries have to export to get U.S. dollars, a strong currency
hurts their exports because it makes their goods expensive to foreign buy-
ers.48 Second, despite the creation of so much new money through QE, the
United States was able to avoid unleashing inflation domestically because
inflation was exported to the world instead, causing, as I discuss later in
the Article, additional angst with the dollar-based system. QE became an
American weapon, especially against China.
Some countries have found ways to fight back. When the United
States warned Russia about Russian aggression in the Ukraine and Cri-
mea, Russian Presidential Advisor Sergei Glazyev shrugged, noting that
“[w]e hold a decent amount of treasury bonds–more than $200 billion–and
if the United States dares to freeze accounts of Russian businesses and
citizens, we can no longer view America as a reliable partner . . . . We will
encourage everybody to dump U.S. Treasury bonds, get rid of dollars as an
unreliable currency and leave the U.S. market.”49
Attacking a country’s currency means attacking it on many fronts.
“The value of a nation’s currency is its Achilles’ heel. If the currency col-
deflation. Relatedly, when more money is created, the value of the currency also goes down.
Prices will likely go up–hence no deflation, but possibly inflation. Devalued currency also has
the benefit of boosting U.S. exports. Michael Janda, Your Questions: Quantitative Easing
Explained, ABC NEWS (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-09-14/what-do-you-
want-to-know-about-quantitative-easing/4260828.
46. Devaluation is a double-edged sword. Countries like China that rely on exports do
not want their currencies to appreciate much because that would make their exports more
expensive to others. On the other hand, no one wants a devalued, worthless currency either.
But because the U.S. dollar is a reserve currency, its devaluation has global implications, as
this Article explains.
47. Brazil Warns of World Currency War, REUTERS (Sept. 28, 2010), http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/8029560/Brazil-warns-of-world-currency-war.html.
48. The term “currency war” has been used to describe competitive devaluations by
countries to achieve a low exchange rate for their currencies. But at the same time it is
important to realize that no one country wants its currency to be so devalued that it becomes
the least valued currency or a worthless currency. Carolyn Cui, Foreign Reserves Slip in
Emerging Markets, Raising Risks, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2015. Sales of U.S. dollars are de-
signed to prop up the value of their own currencies.
49. Greg Morcroft, Ukraine Crisis Takes New Spin as Russia Threatens to Dump US
Treasurys if Sanctions Imposed, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.com/
ukraine-crisis-takes-new-spin-russia-threatens-dump-us-treasurys-if-sanctions-imposed-15592
38.
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lapses, everything else goes with it.”50 Despite globalization, the market
for bonds and stocks is still segmented–not so with currency because
“stocks, bonds, commodities, derivatives and other investments are all
priced in a nation’s currency. If you destroy the currency, you destroy all
markets and the nation.”51 This Article examines how and why the dollar
is being challenged. Part I provides a brief history of the U.S. dollar, show-
ing how it has evolved from something with intrinsic value to something
that has no intrinsic value, except via government fiat. Part I traces the
evolution of money in the United States, from its original foundation in
commodities and gold and silver coins, to the creation of money via Fed-
eral Reserve notes which function as money substitutes, that is, paper in-
struments that represent gold and silver and presumably can be converted
into real money. The aim of Part I is to show that money was originally
rooted in something of value and that over time, its value was debased and
became more attenuated and symbolic rather than intrinsic.
Part II examines U.S. power after World War II and the rise of the
dollar as the preferred currency of the international economic system. It
will focus on the dominance of the dollar-centered global economy and
discuss the “exorbitant privilege”52 the system has given the United States.
For example, to protect this system and the privilege it bestows on the
United States, the United States pressured its allies, particularly Germany,
to refrain from demanding that dollars be exchanged for gold.
The situation today is starkly different. The first serious crack in this
system began in 1971 when President Nixon severed the dollar from the
gold-dollar link. Once the dollar’s gold convertibility was broken, the dol-
lar has no intrinsic value–yet for years, managed to retain its dominance
despite this severance. “For better or worse, contemporary fiat currency
systems do not require bullion in order to function. What they do require
is faith. ‘Credit’ and ‘credible’ come from the same root word, after all.53
We come back to the notion of trust.54 When trust in paper money is
eroded, the system cracks further.
But over the years, the United States has managed to contain these
incipient cracks. Despite its severance from gold, the dollar’s unique status
has been ensured by linking it to oil. “Implicitly since 1945 and explicitly
since 1974, the United States has guaranteed Saudi Arabia’s security in
exchange for Saudi support for the dollar as the sole medium of exchange
for energy exports . . . .”55 Any country that buys Gulf oil must pay in
dollars–hence the term petrodollars. The global demand for dollars contin-
50. JAMES RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS: THE MAKING OF THE NEXT GLOBAL CRISIS
145 (2012) [hereinafter RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS].
51. Id. at 146.
52. EICHENGREEN, supra note 4, at 4.
53. Central Bank Gold Reserves: Monetary Economics with a Vengeance, THE ECONO-
MIST (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/01/central-bank-
gold-reserves.
54. Id.
55. RICKARDS, DEATH OF MONEY, supra note 27, at 156.
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ues because the global demand for oil continues. Part II shows that despite
the immense advantages the dollar has received as a result of the agree-
ment to price oil in dollars, the stresses and fractures responsible for the
rupture of the dollar-gold link continue to this day, exacerbated by inter-
nal dysfunction and external challenges.
Part III explores the consequences for the United States and the inter-
national system if and when the dollar-based system erodes. The dollar
faces both endogenous and exogenous threats. Indeed, the decline of the
dollar-based system is caused by the convergence of many factors. Some
are self-inflicted, that is, a result of a crescendo of debt, deficit and dys-
function. Some may be the inevitable result of other countries catching up
to the United States so that U.S. absolute dominance is diminished if mea-
sured from its heights after World War II. But it is also fair to say that
many countries have worked to diminish the dollar’s role as an interna-
tional reserve, to usher in a different international economic system, and
to benefit from this new de-Americanized world.
Part III also studies the 2008 financial crisis and how global economic
decline and U.S. actions ironically created a double edge sword, prevent-
ing deflation, but also precipitating mistrust in and resentment of dollar
domination. Through QE, the Fed created new money to buy government
bonds and other assets to finance the government’s ballooning deficit. As
Philip Coggan argues, “[t]he world now operates with a system where
money can be created at will or by decree,”56 increasing debt and deficit.
As more dollars are printed, dollars became cheaper. Part III shows how
dollar devaluation during the QE period has upset countries with large
dollar holdings and produced deep fault lines in the international eco-
nomic system.57 Part III also studies the effect of QE on China specifi-
cally, a large holder of dollar assets and on other emerging economies
generally. China does not welcome the devaluation of its dollar holdings
and in fact, sees “[m]aintaining the real value of its reserves [as] one of
[its] keys to maintaining internal social control.”58 China has in fact taken
56. PHILIP COGGAN, PAPER PROMISES: DEBT, MONEY, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER
3 (2011).
57. At the time, QE weakened the dollar abroad. But as Europe and Japan have be-
gun their own QE, the dollar has been rising in value. Jeff Sommer, The Strong Dollar Is
Always Good, Except When It Isn’t, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/01/25/business/the-strong-dollar-is-always-good-except-when-it-isnt.html.
58. RICKARDS, supra note 50, at 159
The value of China’s massive foreign exchange reserves, the fortunes of exporters
and the flows of hot money into the country are all shaped by the [U.S. dollar/
renminbi] USD/RMB exchange rate and the international currency system. China
has a greater stake in the dollar system than many other countries because of its
massive foreign currency reserve and heavy reliance on trade-related growth.
China has found itself constrained by the enduring systemic power of the United
States and the centrality of the dollar in the international monetary system.
Gregory Chin & Wang Yong, Debating the International Currency System: What’s in a Speech,
6 CHINA SECURITY 1, 3-4 (2010).
Fall 2016] Currency Wars 69
countermeasures to prevent financial loss and to carve, in the long run, an
alternative route to the one dominated by the dollar.
Part III also looks at how QE not only devalues the dollar but also
exports inflation to many countries, wreaking financial and political havoc
in the process. When the United States used QE to create new money,
“the money that the US printed to stimulate the US economy did not stay
in the US. It flowed out into the rest of the world and generated a lot of
financial volatility, which in turn negatively affected the livelihoods of bil-
lions of people.”59 As one commentator analogized, it is as if
America, living in one of the cabins on our global boat, encoun-
tered some dirt in its cabin and decided to give it an almighty
scrub by using a lot of soap and water. However, as it did so, it
swept all its dirty water out of its own cabin and “allowed” it to
flow into other cabins on the boat.60
The massive amount of dollars flowing out of the United States, where
interest rate was already close to zero, in search of higher yield in other
countries, led to inflation elsewhere. Chen Deming, the Chinese Com-
merce Minister, charged the United States with irresponsible money print-
ing. “Because the U.S.’ issuance of dollars is out of control and
international commodity prices are continuing to rise, China is being at-
tacked by imported inflation.”61 The Chinese government remembers all
too well that commodity inflation was also a catalyst of the June 1989
Tiananmen Square protests. And as many commentators have noted, it is
not coincidental that civil unrest and riots erupted in Tunisia in early 2011,
spreading to Egypt, Yemen, and beyond, when poor countries in the Mid-
dle East strained their budgets to alleviate the worst effects of food infla-
tion62 partly caused by U.S. QE unleashed.
Despite the considerable advantages of incumbency and the lack of
viable alternatives to the U.S. dollar, it is by no means certain that the
United States can successfully maintain dollar hegemony. In fact, the dol-
lar almost lost its status as the world’s reserve currency in 1978–when the
Federal Reserve dollar index plummeted and the U.S. Treasury had to
59. MAHBUBANI, supra note 3, at 70.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 71.
62. Scott Minerd, U.S. Will Win from Middle East Domino Effect, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 28,
2011), https://www.ft.com/content/31874fd2-4337-11e0-aef2-00144feabdc0
By printing almost $2,000bn dollars and using that money to buy assets, the United
States created a rising tide of liquidity that has lifted all asset prices, including
commodities, and more specifically agricultural products. Just as chronic food
shortages were a big catalyst in the 1991 revolution in the Soviet Union, rising food
prices have been a catalyst for the social unrest in the Middle East and north
Africa.
See also infra notes 253-61 and accompanying text.
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issue government bonds denominated in Swiss francs precisely because
foreign creditors lacked confidence in the dollar as a store of value.63
Although the word “collapse” sounds apocalyptic, the international
monetary system has already collapsed three times in recent history–in
1914, 1939, and 1971. Moreover, that one country can make another coun-
try’s currency collapse cannot be surprising. The United States itself has
waged a currency war against Iran, wreaking devastation on Iran and the
Iranian currency, the rial.64 As Part III shows, U.S. sanctions—against
Iran and Russia, for example—has also meant, ironically, that alternative
non-dollar-based systems are being created by those countries and others
as a counterpunch or as a way to bypass those sanctions. Different coun-
tries are also entering into bilateral trade, using their own currencies,
rather than the dollar, as payment. But more threatening to the dollar’s
supremacy is the decision by many to sever the dollar-oil link, which
would decrease global demand for dollars.
What could trigger collapse? For example, China could dump its dol-
lar-denominated assets, including U.S. Treasury bonds, causing a sharp
rise in U.S. interest rates, inflation, possibly the collapse of the dollar on
foreign exchange markets, and destruction of capital formation. But that
could also mean economic suicide for China, given its own large dollar
holdings. China could also diversify its cash reserves away from dollar-
denominated securities of any kind, and even if the yen, euro, and sterling
instruments are not deemed appealing, it could acquire, instead, commodi-
ties such as gold, oil, copper. Indeed, it has done precisely this. As many
have reported, China has been secretly accumulating gold, ranking now as
both the largest producer as well as the largest importer of gold.65 One can
see that the accumulation of gold by China, as well as Russia, “presages a
shift to a new reserve asset.”66 Gold accumulation is a hedge against dollar
devaluation or dollar collapse.67 Accumulating gold is a way of “getting
out of paper money and into hard assets, while immunizing those assets
from a stock exchange closure . . . . [It] is also a hedge against inflation and
financial panic.”68
Alan Greenspan, the Fed’s thirteenth Chairman, warned, “If China
were to convert a relatively modest part of its $4 trillion foreign exchange
63. RICKARDS, DEATH OF MONEY, supra note 27, at 1.
64. Id. at 54; Jay Solomon, Iran Central Banker Akbar Komijani Seeks Economic
Turnaround, WALL ST. J. (July 1, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-central-banker-ak
bar-komijani-seeks-economic-turnaround-1404257967 (“The sanctions the Obama adminis-
tration placed on Bank Markazi blocked the institution from conducting financial transac-
tions with virtually any foreign bank and drastically cut Tehran’s ability to repatriate most oil
revenues.”).
65. Shu-Ching Jean Chen, China’s Secret Vaults: Where Is All the Missing Gold,
FORBES (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/shuchingjeanchen/2014/03/18/chinas-se
cret-vaults-where-is-all-the-missing-gold/.
66. RICKARDS, DEATH OF MONEY, supra note 27, at 12.
67. Clinch, Russia-China Relations, supra note 43.
68. RICKARDS, DEATH OF MONEY, supra note 27, at 171.
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reserves into gold, the country’s currency could take on unexpected
strength in today’s international financial system.”69 Although a return to
the gold standard is not likely to occur in today’s world of paper money
and floating exchange rates, Greenspan’s caution about the unique status
of gold and its continued relevance bears special scrutiny. According to
Greenspan,
gold has special properties that no other currency, with the possi-
ble exception of silver, can claim. For more than two millennia,
gold has had virtually unquestioned acceptance as payment. . . .
No questions are raised when gold or direct claims to gold are
offered in payment of an obligation; it was the only form of pay-
ment, for example, that exporters to Germany would accept as
World War II was drawing to a close. Today, the acceptance of fiat
money . . . rests on the credit guarantee of sovereign nations en-
dowed with effective taxing power, a guarantee that in crisis con-
ditions has not always matched the universal acceptability of
gold.70
Indeed, the fact that central banks all over the world still hold gold
reserves is proof of its continuing importance even in a world of fiat cur-
rency. Not only has Germany begun the process of bringing its gold stored
in New York back, it also wants the gold unencumbered. In this post-2008
financial crisis world, “the debate over a collapse of strictly paper-based
currency is experiencing a renaissance–as is the dispute over the gold
reserves.”71 For example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel rejected the
suggestion floated by many European partners to use Germany’s massive
gold reserves as collateral for European bonds.72 And China, as Green-
span noted, continued to hold on to its nearly 13 million ounces of gold,
even boosting its holdings as it became the world’s fifth-largest sovereign
holder of gold.73
The accumulation of gold and other developments described in Part
III together constitute a serious challenge to the dollar-based system.
These developments include the establishment of the NDB and other
BRICS actions to undermine and replace the dollar with other currencies;
the historic gas deal between Russia and China and equally significant, the
strategic decision not to denominate the deal in dollars; the increasing in-
ternational concern over the long term strength of the dollar and the con-
tinuing requests by different countries to repatriate their gold holdings
69. Alan Greenspan, Golden Rule, Why Beijing Is Buying, FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 29,
2014), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-09-29/golden-rule [hereinaf-
ter Greenspan, Golden Rule].
70. Id.
71. Sven Böll & Anne Seith, Precious Metal Abroad: Why Germany Wants to See Its
U.S. Gold, DER SPIEGEL (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/ger
man-politicians-demand-to-see-gold-in-us-federal-reserve-a-864068.html.
72. Id.
73. Greenspan, Golden Rule, supra note 69.
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from the United States; and the accumulation of gold by China in particu-
lar, whether by mining in China or outside of China.
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to describe the specifics
of a future non-dollar universe,74 it is a crucial first step that challenges to
the system be understood and diagnosed. Already, as of November 2015,
the yuan was designated by the IMF as one of five elite currencies in the
world, fit for inclusion in the SDR basket of currencies comprised of the
dollar, the euro, the pound, and the yen. This development carried not
only symbolic weight but also reflected new fault lines in “changing cur-
rency dynamics . . . [and] new geopolitical concerns.”75 As discussed later,
the rise of the yuan will make it easier for many countries to bypass the
dollar in economic transactions or to evade Western sanctions.76 And it is
likely that if and when the yuan is ready to dethrone the dollar as a pre-
mier reserve currency, it would, unlike the dollar, be backed by gold.77
As the two Chinese authors of Unrestricted Warfare astutely ob-
served, the disintegration of the Soviet Union was swift and astonishing:
A powerful empire collapsed without a single shot being fired,
vividly corroborating the lines of the famous poem by Kipling,
‘When empires perish, it is not with a rumble, but a snicker.’ Not
only was this true for the former Soviet Union, today the Ameri-
cans seem to be following in the footsteps of their old
adversary. . . .78
To close the Introduction, I include this apt quote from John Maynard
Keynes: “There is no subtler, surer means of overturning the basis of soci-
ety than to debauch the currency.”79
74. As some scholars indicate,
Within a decade or so, a ‘reserve currency basket’ may emerge, with central banks
storing wealth in a mix of dollars, yuan, rupee, reals and roubles, as well as pre-
cious metals. Perhaps some kind of synthetic bundle of the world’s leading curren-
cies will be developed, with emphasis placed, after years of western money-
printing, on assets backed by commodities and other tangibles.
Halligan, The Dollar’s Dominance, supra note 9.
75. Keith Bradsher, China’s Renminbi Is Approved by I.M.F. as a Main World Cur-
rency, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/01/business/international
/china-renminbi-reserve-currency.html?_r=0 [hereinafter Bradsher, China’s Renminbi].
76. Id.
77. L. Todd Wood, The Day China Says Its Currency is Backed by Gold, WASH. TIMES
(Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/aug/18/l-todd-wood-day-china-
says-its-currency-backed-gol/.
78. LANG & XIANGSUI, supra note 30, at 23.
79. VINCENT BARNETT, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 82 (2012).
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MONEY
A. Commodities, Coins, and Paper Money
What is money exactly? The noted Nobel economist Milton Friedman
defined money simply as “whatever is generally accepted in exchange for
goods and services–accepted not as an object to be consumed but as an
object that represents a temporary abode of purchasing power to be used
for buying still other goods and services.”80 Money is used “as a medium
of exchange, as a unit of account, and as a store of value.”81 A dollar bill
qualifies as it plays all three roles. It is a unit of account because it is a
measure of the value of goods and services. It is a medium of exchange
because it is exchanged to acquire something, and it is a store of value
because “it is a repository of purchasing power over time.”82
The earliest forms of money were commodities–animal skins, live-
stock, beads, shells, corn, olive oil, tobacco, salt, etc.83 To be considered
money, “it should itself possess value, and it must therefore have utility as
the basis of value.”84 When English settlers arrived in Massachusetts in
1620, they brought English money with them but when their supply ran
out, the colonists had trouble finding a substitute because the English
monarchs prohibited the export of coins and because the colonists did not
have a mint or permission to establish one.85 Commodity currency became
legal tender. Trade with Native American tribes involved the exchange of
furs, skins and other commodities for wampum, snail, and clam shells. Be-
cause many of these commodities had disadvantages of spoilage and bulk,
the colonists continued their search for other forms of money, such as
coins. Although they could obtain English coins by exporting, it was easier
to get Spanish coins from the West Indies, through smuggling and piracy.86
The preference for coins, however, was displaced when the colonies
declared independence. Without an adequate supply of gold and silver,
also known as specie,87 to pay for the war, the Continental Congress is-
sued paper money88 and IOUs or continentals. Individual colonies also
80. MILTON FRIEDMAN, MONEY MISCHIEF 16 (1992).
81. FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING AND FINANCIAL
MARKETS 49-51 (6th ed. 2001). (discussing the functions of money).
82. Id. at 51.
83. WILLIAM STANLEY JEVONS, MONEY AND THE MECHANISM OF EXCHANGE 19-29
(1875).
84. Id. at 32.
85. EICHENGREEN, supra note 4, at 9.
86. Id. at 9-11.
87. As understood by the Founders, specie was gold or silver. See Specie Payments,
Suspension, and Resumption of, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM (2003), http://www.encyclopedia.com/
history/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/specie-payments-suspension-an
d/.
88. KWARTENG, supra note 22, at 40-41 (“One popular work of what became known as
political economy, translated from French by none other than Thomas Jefferson, and recom-
mended by John Adams, referred to paper money as a ‘theft’ which was ‘ruinous’ since ‘in
this money there is absolutely no real value.’”).
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issued their own bills, resulting in “bills trading at a confusing variety of
different prices, inflation, and the disappearance of gold and silver from
circulation.”89 The bills constituted a promise of the Continental Congress
to pay face value of each bill in silver coin to any holder on demand.90
Nonetheless, it was widely suspected that the continentals were not truly
backed by silver or gold and the paper bills were often refused as payment.
Congress passed a resolution declaring that any person who refused to
receive bills of credit would be considered an enemy and ostracized from
the community.91 The Committee on the Treasury recommended that the
quantity of paper money be reduced to prevent depreciation.92 As Karen
Flamme outlines in a 1995 Annual Report, “[w]ithout solid backing and
with rising inflation, the Continentals soon became worthless, thus the ex-
pression ‘not worth a Continental.’”93 Despite efforts by Congress to sup-
port the continentals, the market sent a different message: the continentals
were discounted, so that those who paid their debt in continentals were
charged more than those paying with gold or silver.94
The Continental Congress’ failed experiment with paper money was
not forgotten at the Constitutional Convention in 1787. Many writers from
the founding period wrote extensively about the evils of paper money.95
John Adams warned that paper money would be “as cheap as oak
leaves.”96 Gold and silver have reliably served as the preferred money of
the world all over because supply is limited and “because the people were
confident that everyone would always accept them.”97 William Blackstone
explained the value of gold and silver in this way: “Money is a universal
medium, or common standard, . . . a sign, which represents the respective
values of all commodities. Metals are well calculated for this sign, because
89. EICHENGREEN, supra note 4, at 11.
90. 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 407 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., William S. Hein & Co. 2005) (1905) (The bill of credit entitled “the
bearer to receive Spanish milled dollars or the value thereof in gold or silver, according to a
resolution of Congress passed at Philadelphia, November 29, 1775”).
91. 4 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 49 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., William S. Hein & Co. 2005) (1906); see also TOM GITTINGS & KEN
GOLDSMITH, MONEY MATTERS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH MONEY 4 (2000), http://
files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED456074.pdf.
92. 13 JOURNALS OF CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 492, 493 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., William S. Hein & Co. 2005).
93. KAREN FLAMME, THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO, 1995 AN-
NUAL REPORT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF OUR NATION’S PAPER MONEY (1995), http://www.
frbsf.org/files/1995_annual_report.pdf.
94. GITTINGS & GOLDSMITH, supra note 91, at 4.
95. KWARTENG, supra note 22, at 42 (“To the oddly named Pelatiah Webster . . . paper
money ‘polluted the equity of our laws, turned them into engines of oppression, corrupted
the justice of our public administration, destroyed the fortunes of thousands who had confi-
dence in it . . . and went far to destroy the morality of our people.’”).
96. JOHN ADAMS, THE WISDOM OF JOHN ADAMS 20 (Kees de Mooy ed., 2003).
97. JAMES WILLARD HURST, A LEGAL HISTORY OF MONEY IN THE U.S., 1774-1970, at
47 (1973); see also PETER L. BERNSTEIN, THE POWER OF GOLD: THE HISTORY OF AN OBSES-
SION 15, 242 (2001).
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they are durable . . . and a precious metal is still better calculated for this
purpose, because it is the most portable.”98
At the Constitutional Convention, the Framers debated the issue of
paper currency and the prevailing sentiment was that “almost all the
speakers feared that if the government held broad power to issue paper
money, it could not be trusted to avoid disastrous inflation or legislative
disturbance of vested money claims.”99 Article I, Section 8 of the Consti-
tution provides that Congress shall have power “to coin money, regulate
the value thereof, and of foreign coin . . . .”100 Article I, Section 10 pro-
vides: “No state shall . . . coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything
but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts.”101
From then until the Civil War, the federal government did not issue a
paper currency.102 But the Civil War, which launched a cash-strapped gov-
ernment into financial crisis, changed the monetary landscape. As the Su-
preme Court described it, “the public treasury was nearly empty, and the
credit of the government . . . had become nearly exhausted. . . . The entire
amount of coin in the country . . . was insufficient to supply the need of the
government three months, had it all been poured into the treasury.”103
Congress used the power to borrow money on the credit of the U.S., enu-
merated in Article I, Section 8, Clause 2, to create paper money. For the
first time since the issuance by the Continental Congress of the Con-
tinentals, Congress authorized Demand Notes, printed in $5, $10, and $20
denominations and green in color–hence the name “greenbacks”–which
could be redeemed in coins.104 In 1862, Congress issued new Legal Tender
Notes or U.S. Notes also printed with green ink. “Confidence in the notes
waned somewhat when the Treasury stopped redeeming them in coins dur-
ing the Civil War to save gold and silver. However, redemption resumed in
1879 following the war.”105
Several important features characterized these notes. They were de-
clared to be legal tender in payment of public and private debts.106 “Thus,
greenbacks were no longer promissory notes redeemable into constitu-
98. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 266 (1765) (William S.
Hein & Co., Inc. eds., 1992).
99. HURST, supra note 97, at 14.
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
102. Privately owned banks did issue paper money known as bank bills or banknotes,
redeemable upon demand by the issuing bank for a specified amount of specie. Ali Khan,
The Evolution of Money: A Story of Constitutional Nullification, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 393, 408
(1999); John J. Chung, Money as Simulacrum: The Legal Nature and Reality of Money, 5
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 109, 128 (2009).
103. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 540-41 (1870).
104. Flamme, supra note 93, at 4. In 1862, Congress passed a bill authorizing the Secre-
tary of the Treasury to issue, on the credit of the United States, 150 million paper dollars,
officially known as U.S. notes. Act of Feb. 25, 1862, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 345.
105. Id.
106. Chung, supra note 102, at 131 (quoting Kenneth W. Dam, The Legal Tender Cases,
1981 SUP. CT. R. 367, 373 (1981)).
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tional money. Rather, they were designed to circulate as the new official
currency.”107 Second, although greenbacks were not redeemable into gold
or silver, they had investment value, that is, the holders could convert
them into 6% interest twenty-year bonds.108 Congress thus has “intro-
duced a cycle of monetized paper. The greenbacks could be converted into
interest-bearing investment paper, that is, government bonds and certifi-
cates. The bonds and certificates were redeemable, but only in greenbacks.
In this cycle of conversion, paper for paper, the constitutional coin
disappeared.”109
Inflation meant that the greenbacks fell in value against gold which
raised questions about whether creditors could refuse payment in green-
backs and demand gold.110 In Knox v. Lee, the Supreme Court held that
Congress had Constitutional authority to endow what is essentially paper
money, called treasury notes, with the legal qualities of money and that
the legal tender legislation was constitutionally applicable both to preex-
isting as well as subsequent debts.111
This case provoked strong dissent. Justice Clifford observed, for exam-
ple, that the Framers understood that “gold and silver were adopted to
serve the purpose of exchange by the tacit concurrence of all nations . . .
[t]hey not only knew that the money of the commercial world was gold
and silver, but they also knew . . . that paper promises . . . were utterly
worthless as a standard of value.”112
The central question is how to make paper money, which is essentially
worthless, into something acceptable and valuable in ordinary times, and
perhaps more spectacularly, in the case of the dollar, into something that
the entire world believes is valuable as well.
B. Central Bank, Federal Reserve and the Rise of the Dollar
In the early years, the United States did not have a central bank, and
“American banking was a hodgepodge of state-chartered banks with no
federal regulation or uniformity in operating laws.”113 After the 1907 bank
panic, it was determined that without a central bank, the federal govern-
ment was not able to expand or contract the nation’s money supply to
smooth out booms and busts. “In 1913 a major change in paper currency
107. Khan, supra note 102, at 425.
108. Id. (citing Act of Feb. 25, 1862, ch. 33, §1, 12 Stat. 345).
109. Id.
110. In Hepburn v. Griswold, the issue was “whether Congress has [the] power to make
notes issued under its authority a legal tender in payment of debts which, when contracted,
were payable by law in gold and silver coin.” 75 U.S. 603, 610 (1869).
111. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 553-54 (1870). Some Founders such as Madison recog-
nized the need to take into consideration national emergencies, whereupon the government
would be allowed to issue promissory notes. However, Madison would not allow the govern-
ment the power to make them legal tender. Khan, supra note 102, at 405, 427.
112. Knox, 79 U.S. at 605.
113. Flamme, supra note 93.
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occurred with the passage of the Federal Reserve Act . . .”114 creating a
Federal Reserve System of regional reserve banks guided by a Board
whose members would not be picked by bankers but rather by the presi-
dent and subject to Senate confirmation.”115 The Fed’s main role is to
serve as a lender of last resort “to furnish an elastic currency . . . and to
establish a more effective supervision of banking in the U.S.”116
The Fed creates money through open market operations conducted by
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. When the federal government
needs money because it is short of funds, the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee approves the purchase of U.S. government bonds, issued by the
Treasury Department, on the open market. The Federal Reserve Notes are
issued to the regional federal banks at the discretion of the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System.117 The Federal Reserve Act of 1913
specifically provided that the Federal Reserve Notes “shall be redeemed
in gold on demand at the Treasury Department of the U.S., in the city of
Washington, District of Columbia, or in gold or lawful money at any Fed-
eral reserve bank.”118 A written legend appeared on the face of the
Notes–“redeemable in gold on demand.”
World War I provided a significant boost to American finance. Al-
though it was a neutral country, the United States provided around 75
percent of Britain’s foreign loans.119 “[T]he commitment of New York to
keeping gold payments ‘provided the plainest possible evidence to the
outside world that the United States was at the moment . . . the one local-
ity in which the world’s floating capital could be safely lodged without fear
of depreciation of its value.’”120 Because the war damaged the ability of
banks in Europe to provide credit, capital to finance trade became scarce.
As a result, “German and British banks turned to New York to accept
endorsed bills for their clients’ imports . . . [t]he credit they received was
denominated in dollars because this was the currency with which the New
York banks were familiar.”121 These developments “accentuated the need
for a national currency for ‘global invoicing, payments, and reserve
purposes.’”122
The dollar’s ascendency was also accelerated by the sterling’s decline.
The British government suspended gold payments in 1914 and in 1915,
forbade British banks from lending to borrowers outside the British Em-
114. Id.
115. RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 51-52.
116. Federal Reserve Act, 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (codified in various sections of 12
U.S.C.).
117. Federal Reserve Notes are authorized by Section 16 of the Federal Reserve Act of
1913 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 411).
118. Federal Reserve Act, 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251; Federal Reserve Act, 1913, ch. 16, 38
Stat. 265.
119. KWARTENG, supra note 22, at 105.
120. Id.
121. EICHENGREEN, supra note 4, at 26.
122. Khan, supra note 102, at 435 (citation omitted).
78 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 38:57
pire, prompting Alexander Noyes, a noted financial journalist of the 1920s,
to declare that by this decision, London “ceased to be the money centre of
the world.”123 U.S banks quickly expanded abroad and by 1920, American
banks had opened 181 branches outside the United States–importers ac-
cepted drafts in dollars drawn by American exporters; exporters exporting
to the United States also drew in dollars on U.S. banks.124
Capital flowed from the capital-rich United States to capital-scarce
Europe as “American banks arranged bond issues for European govern-
ments and corporations, denominating them in dollars so they could be
marketed to American investors.”125 By 1924 the foreign exchange
reserves of central banks consisted of more dollars more than sterling.126
Despite advantages of incumbency, the sterling was speedily displaced
after World War I by the dollar. Perhaps it took a shock like World War I
and an aggressive, gung ho Fed to displace the sterling. Still, incumbency
can only do so much. It is not inconceivable that despite its dominance in
today’s economy, the dollar too, under a combination of circumstances,
can be displaced.
C. The Dollar in the Depression
The Great Depression had a catastrophic effect on the dollar. Be-
tween 1929 and 1933, real output in the United States fell nearly 30 per-
cent and the unemployment rate rose from 3 percent to nearly 25
percent.127 The stock market plummeted, banks failed, and businesses and
households declared bankruptcies. Trade contracted because of a fall in
output and spending, and governments everywhere imposed tariffs and
quotas to protect domestic industry.128
Not surprisingly, “with the decline in international transactions came a
decline in the international role of the dollar.”129 Fewer international
transactions meant fewer dollars, as foreigners were not purchasing U.S.
imports. Consequently, “the tendency to hold balances in New York to
service such obligations declined commensurately.”130
Globally important currencies suffered during the Depression as well.
For example, when the financial crisis spread to Germany, Berlin stopped
payments owed to London banks,131 damaging both the London banks’
financial well-being as well as Britain’s balance of payments. By July 1931,
123. KWARTENG, supra note 22, at 107-08.
124. EICHENGREEN, supra note 4, at 28.
125. Id. at 31.
126. Id. at 32.
127. Ben S. Bernanke, H. Parker Willis Lecture in Econ. Policy at Washington and Lee
Univ., Money, Gold, and the Great Depression (Mar. 2, 2004), http://www.federalreserve.gov
/boardDocs/speehes/2004/200403022/default.htm.
128. EICHENGREEN, supra note 4, at 33.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 34.
131. See RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 67.
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financial instability in England became all the more acute when investors
took gold and money out of England, converting sterling into foreign cur-
rency and depositing it elsewhere. The sterling’s depreciation raised fears
about the specter of other depreciation, such as that of the dollar.
As Ben Bernanke, Fed Chairman from 2006 to 2014, said,
Central banks as well as private investors converted a substantial
quantity of dollar assets to gold in . . . 1931, reducing the Federal
Reserve’s gold reserves. . . . Fearing imminent devaluation of the
dollar, many . . . depositors withdrew their funds from U.S. banks
in order to convert them into gold or other assets.132
In response,
the Fed decided to ignore the plight of the banking system and to
focus only on stopping the loss of gold reserves to protect the dol-
lar. To stabilize the dollar, the Fed once again raised interest rates
sharply, on the view that currency speculators would be less will-
ing to liquidate dollar assets if they could earn a higher rate of
return on them. The Fed’s strategy worked, in that the attack on
the dollar subsided and the U.S. commitment to the gold standard
was successfully defended, at least for the moment.133
As England and other countries went off the gold standard in 1931,134
their currencies went down and thus the costs of their exports also went
down,135 making their exports less expensive and thus more competitive
than the domestic goods of the importing countries. The United States
chose not to devalue the dollar against other currencies because competi-
tive devaluation by one country would have resulted in a tit-for-tat cycle of
retaliatory devaluation by others. Therefore, “[r]ather than devalue
against other paper currencies, FDR chose to devalue against the ultimate
currency–gold.”136
132. Bernanke, supra note 127, at 67.
133. Id. See KWARTENG, supra note 22, at 127 (“[T]he Federal Reserve did precisely the
opposite of what modern bankers would have done. They raised interest rates when they
should have lowered them.”).
134. RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 70.
135. Devaluation causes a country’s exports to become less expensive, making them
more competitive on the global market. This in turn means that imports are more expensive
and domestic consumers are less likely to buy them. If one U.S. dollar equals 93 Japanese
yen, a car that costs 2,325,000 yen would cost $25,000 U.S. dollars when exported to the
United States. See BARBARA GOTTFRIED HOLLANDER, HOW CURRENCY DEVALUATION
WORKS 42 (2011). But if the yen were devalued so that one U.S. dollar now equals 100
Japanese yen, a car that costs 2,325,000 yen would cost 23,250 dollars. When the yen went
down in value, Japanese exports cost less to U.S. consumers, thus boosting the sale of Japa-
nese products.
136. RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 70. For a discussion of actions
taken by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to address the gold-dollar convertibility, see
KWARTENG, supra note 22, at 130-31.
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But gold was held not only in the Federal Reserve Banks; it circulated
privately as legal tender and was also secreted in private safe deposit
boxes. Although it was possible for the government to devalue the dollar
against gold simply by using the President’s emergency economic powers
to declare that gold could be redeemed at, for example, $25 dollars per
ounce instead of the gold standard price then of $20.67 per ounce, this
benefit would accrue to private gold hoarders. It would not put gold back
into circulation. Rather, it could motivate people to use their paper dollars
to buy more gold and hoard it in the belief that the dollar could be further
devalued and the value of gold would be further increased.137 One of the
main objectives was
to ensure that any gains from the revaluation of gold would go to
the government and not the hoarders, while citizens would be left
with no forms of money except paper. If gold could be removed
from private hands and if citizens could be made to expect further
devaluations in their paper money, they might be inclined to start
spending it rather than hold on to a depreciating asset.138
For the government’s plan to work, hoarding or possessing gold had to
be prohibited. Furthermore, to protect the government’s own dwindling
gold reserves, President Roosevelt outlawed all redemption of gold. Joint
Resolution of 1933 declared that obligations, public or private, that re-
quired payment in gold “obstruct the power of the Congress to regulate
the value of the money of the United States . . .”139 The Gold Reserve Act
of 1934 providing that U.S. currency could not be redeemed in gold140 was
upheld by the Supreme Court in Norman v. Baltimore & O.R. Co. on the
ground that Congress had the constitutional authority to regulate currency
and establish a monetary system without undue interference by private
parties via contract.141
Additional measures include President Roosevelt’s Executive Order
6102, which not only banned private ownership of gold by U.S. citizens but
also required U.S. persons, with few exceptions, to surrender their gold in
exchange for paper money at the exchange rate of $20.67 per ounce.142 To
further increase the U.S. hoard of gold, President Roosevelt prohibited
the export of gold from the United States and ordered U.S. gold mines to
sell their production to the government at a price determined by the Trea-
sury Department.143
137. RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 70-71.
138. Id. at 71.
139. H.R.J. Res. 192, 73d Cong. (1933).
140. Gold Reserve Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-87, § 6, 48 Stat. 337, 340.
141. 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
142. RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 71; see also Exec. Order No. 6,102,
reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 248 (1933).
143. RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 72.
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Fast forward to 2016 when the connection between the dollar and gold
is completely severed (as discussed below). Interestingly, although Fed
notes no longer contain a printed ledger promising redemption on their
face, the law still allows for redemption, but not for gold–only for “lawful
money on demand at the Treasury Department of the United States, in the
city of Washington, District of Columbia, or at any Federal Reserve
bank.”144Apparently, Fed notes and “lawful money” are deemed to be dif-
ferent and thus the intriguing question is what is considered lawful
money? For example, is gold coin lawful money as referred to in the Fed-
eral Reserve Act? Although “[t]he gold coin, first adopted a unit of cur-
rency in the Coinage Act of 1849 . . . remains the lawful money of the
United States,”145 Congress does not allow the Treasury Department to
mint one dollar gold coins.146 Treasury may mint and sell gold but only for
numismatic purposes and the Fed cannot redeem Fed notes at par using
these numismatic coins.147 One can reasonably conclude that “therefore,
lawful money exists in the form of gold coins but not for the stated
redemption.”148
Consequently, currently, there is in fact no real “lawful money” to
redeem Federal Reserve notes. Even when redemption of money substi-
tutes into constitutional currency–gold–was suspended during times of na-
tional emergencies, such as the Great Depression, it was still understood
that there is a distinction to be drawn between lawful money and money-
substitutes. Today, ironically, “paper money is convertible only into an-
other form of paper money . . . ”149 and the dollar is quintessentially fiat
money.
II. THE BRETTON WOODS AGREEMENT AND THE RISE OF THE
DOLLAR
As noted above, although there was no overarching international
monetary system before 1945, “[f]or about 35 years prior to the outbreak
of World War I, the major Western countries . . . tied their currencies to
gold, so that the rate of exchange among the principal currencies was es-
sentially fixed.”150 By contrast, the disastrous interwar years were charac-
terized by extreme instability with countries alternating between
maintaining and severing the link to gold. As World War II wound down,
144. 12 U.S.C. § 411 (1934).
145. Khan, supra note 102, at 439.
146. Id. at 440.
147. Id.
148. Id. In the case of silver, “[s]imilar to numismatic gold coins, silver coins are both
legal tender and lawful money. Thus, lawful money in the form of numismatic silver coins
exists but not for the redemption of Federal Reserve notes.” Id.
149. Id. at 441.
150. THOMAS COTTIER, JOHN H. JACKSON & ROSA M. LASTRA, INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN FINANCIAL REGULATION AND MONETARY AFFAIRS 53 n. 1 (2012); Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
The International Monetary System: A Look Back Over Seven Decades, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L.
575, 576 (2010).
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in July 1944, representatives of forty-four nations assembled in Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire, to create a new organization for a post-war fi-
nancial system.
After World War II, the United States experienced unparalleled
growth and its currency became the unquestioned top dog currency of the
international system. Bretton Woods may be cast as a grand international
system, but it reflected American preferences.151 Although the dollar
played a key role pursuant to Bretton Woods, the system remained
anchored in gold to “the extent to which gold was seen as a symbol of
stability.”152 However, this gold standard came with a new twist. The sys-
tem was anchored to gold through the dollar at a fixed price of $35 dollars
an ounce of gold.153 “For foreign central banks and governments the dol-
lar was as good as gold, since the United States stood ready to sell gold at
a fixed price of $35 an ounce.”154
Other countries that could have issued international currencies lacked
either open financial markets or financial stability, like Germany and
France respectively.155 The French franc was once an important reserve
currency, but the war in Algeria drained the French central bank which
lost two-thirds of its reserves in 1955–1957.156 By the 1970s, West Ger-
many could have been a legitimate rival to the United States but given
German history of hyperinflation, the German central bank was preoccu-
pied with keeping inflation in check by tightening monetary policy and
raising interest rates. High interest rates, however, predictably attracted
international capital seeking higher returns, creating in turn an excess of
credit which again stoked fears of inflation. As a result, Germany re-
stricted nonresidents from buying money market instruments by imposing
various forms of controls, making the deutsche mark unattractive as a re-
serve currency.157
Similarly, the British sterling never recovered from its decline during
World War I, and although Japan became a rising power in the third quar-
ter of the twentieth century and the second largest economy in the world
by the 1970s, its currency was never an international powerhouse. Asia
still harbored resentment against Japanese colonialism and given the Japa-
nese policy of development via export promotion, “a hypercompetitive ex-
change rate”158 had to be maintained to ensure Japanese exports
remained cheap and competitive. For the yen to achieve reserve status,
151. RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 79.
152. KWARTENG, supra note 22, at 4; see also id. at 4-5 (“The move back to some form
of ‘gold exchange standard’ was an attempt to restore a degree of order to a world still
devastated by world war and depression.”).
153. Id. at 143 (describing how Bretton Woods was not just a fixed exchange rate sys-
tem, like the pre-1974 gold standard system, but also a more rigid system).
154. EICHENGREEN, supra note 4, at 39.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 42-43.
157. Id. at 44.
158. Id.
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foreigners must also be allowed to invest freely in the country, which could
have potentially undermined the government’s industrial policies.159
Thus, the dollar became unquestionably the top dog currency. Al-
though central banks could still accumulate gold, the gold supply was lim-
ited, which made a currency such as the dollar more appealing. Moreover,
the two main producers of gold were despised regimes–the Soviet Union
and South Africa–and so accumulating gold would mean benefiting
them.160
The dominance of the dollar and of the United States meant great
economic advantages for the country and the American people. For exam-
ple, U.S. consumers and investors could buy foreign goods and acquire
foreign companies by using dollars that would be freely accepted. At the
same time, the U.S. government did not have to worry that the dollars
accumulated by foreigners would be redeemed for gold, because foreign-
ers were willing to accept and keep dollars – as dollars were as good as
gold.161 “This ability to purchase foreign goods and companies using re-
sources conjured out of thin air was the exorbitant privilege of which
French Finance Minister Vaéry Giscard d’Estaing so vociferously
complained.”162
Under the original Articles of Agreement of the IMF, pursuant to Ar-
ticle IV (4)(a): “Each member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund to
promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements
with other members, and to avoid competitive exchange alterations.”
Member states were not allowed to devalue their currencies unless permit-
ted by the IMF, and permission would be granted only in cases of persis-
tent trade deficits and high inflation.
Mandatory contributions to the Fund are payable one-quarter in hard
assets (under the original articles, in gold, and under the amended articles,
in special drawing rights) and three-quarters in their own currencies.163
Each member state is assigned a quota and a country with a large quota is
required to make a greater contribution, but is also entitled to greater
drawing rights from the Fund’s resources.
Countries suffering from balance of payments deficits could draw on
this pool to fulfill their obligation to maintain the par value of their cur-
rencies,164 assuming they meet IMF conditions. The dollar’s dominance is
159. Id. at 44-45.
160. Id. at 39.
161. See id. at 40.
162. Id.
163. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art. 3-4, Dec. 27, 1945,
2 U.N.T.S. 39.
164. Lowenfeld, supra note 150, at 580. Under IMF rules,
drawing rights . . . were to have the function of reserves, that is, the resources
drawn could be used to settle accounts with creditor countries. Indeed, if a creditor
country knew that the debtor country had the right to draw from the Fund up to a
stated amount, it might well prolong the credit and not insist on immediate
settlement.
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reflected in its preeminent position within the IMF. For example, because
“only a few members’ currencies were generally acceptable for settlement
of international accounts–the so-called ‘freely usable’ or ‘freely converti-
ble’ currencies,” typically the member state with balance-of-payments
problems would draw U.S. dollars from the IMF.165 Under Article V of
the original Articles, the member state would purchase dollars or some
other freely usable currency with its own currency and would be obligated
to repurchase its own currency within a stated period.166
From 1946 to 1971, the system worked well, and when hiccups oc-
curred, the United States assured countries it stood ready to meet “the
commitment . . . to buy and sell gold at the existing price of $35 an
ounce.”167 Concern about the United States, however, grew as the Viet-
nam War and the Great Society programs created great strain on the U.S.
treasury. Because the value of the dollar was not linked to other curren-
cies but rather to gold, speculators who suspect a dollar devaluation would
buy gold and would turn to the London gold market. This market had
been defined by the so-called London Gold Pool since 1961, which is a
price-fixing albeit open market operation run by the United States and
other countries which are committed to use their gold and dollar reserves
to keep the market price of gold at $35 dollars per ounce as agreed to at
Bretton Woods.
The Gold Pool was both seller and buyer, buying and selling as much
as needed to maintain the $35 price. By 1965, the pool was mostly a selling
operation. As gold supplies fell off, Gold Pool members had to dump gold
to keep its price (in dollars) from rising on the London market.168
But the pressure on the dollar continued unabated. For example, de-
nied military ambitions after the war, Germany and Japan focused on their
economies, became economic powerhouses, mostly by exporting, and suc-
ceeded in accumulating all the dollars they needed. In some ways, this was
also good for the United States because those same dollars could be used
to pay for imports of U.S. goods. But this was a double-edged sword. The
system was founded on the notion that the dollar was the equivalent of
gold. If there are now more foreign-held dollars than U.S. gold holdings,
the threat to the system could be serious if foreign holders were all to
redeem dollars for gold.
This problem was identified early on by the Belgian economist Robert
Triffin and has been referred aptly as the Triffin Dilemma. The Triffin Di-
lemma stated that if the United States did not run trade deficits, that is, if
it were not willing to supply the trading system with an unlimited supply of
dollars (for countries that received dollars when they exported), trade
would contract, growth would be stunted, and the contraction would dam-
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Statement by the President Following the Action by the United Kingdom, 3
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1599 (Nov. 18, 1967).
168. See EICHENGREEN, supra note 4, at 51-52; KWARTENG, supra note 22, at 211-12.
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age the international economic system. On the other hand, if the United
States continued to run trade deficits and hence provide an unlimited sup-
ply of dollars to the rest of the world, confidence in the U.S. ability to
convert dollars to gold would diminish.169 Pressure on the dollar would
not be sustainable in the long run and Triffin recommended that an artifi-
cial unit of money be used instead of the dollar which would allow govern-
ments to accept them in international transactions.170
Pressure on the dollar was exerted in other ways as well. In 1965, Pres-
ident Charles de Gaulle of France denounced both the Bretton Woods
system as “abusive and dangerous”171 and the dollar’s prominence in the
international monetary system, calling for a return to the classical gold
standard, that is, “an indisputable monetary base, and one that does not
bear the mark of any particular country. In truth, one does not see how
one could really have any standard criterion other than gold.”172 France
and Spain converted $150 and $60 million of their respective dollar
reserves into gold, creating great pressure on the dollar and a huge drain
on U.S. gold reserves.173
Fortunately, the United States was able to rely on Germany, a Gold
Pool country, to support the dollar. Germany was a crucial country be-
cause of its large dollar holdings accumulated through trade surpluses with
the United States. German demand for redemption of dollars for gold
would have triggered a serious dollar crisis.174 But, most German politi-
cians sought to preserve the security alliance with the United States. In a
secret letter, the President of the Deutsche Bundesbank assured the Fed-
eral Reserve that because
expenditures resulting from the presence of American troops in
Germany [could] lead to U.S. losses of gold . . . [T]he
Bundesbank . . . has not converted any . . . dollars . . . into gold. . . .
You may be assured that in the future the Bundesbank intends to
169. EICHENGREEN, supra note 4, at 50; ROBERT TRIFFIN, GOLD AND THE DOLLAR
CRISIS: THE FUTURE OF CONVERTIBILITY 8-9 (1960); see also JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ ET AL.,
THE STIGLITZ REPORT: REFORMING THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL SYS-
TEMS IN THE WAKE OF THE GLOBAL CRISIS 157-58 (2010) (describing how the Triffin di-
lemma–“the use of a national currency (the U.S. dollar) as the international reserve
currency”–tends to create excess demand for the currency of the issuer, in this case the
United States. This excess demand means the United States has to continue providing liquid-
ity to the world by issuing debt denominated in dollars and continuing to run trade deficits,
which in turn erode confidence in the dollar as a store of value).
170. In the 1960s, it was Europe and Japan that accumulated dollars as they rapidly
expanded after World War II. Today, it is emerging markets such as China and India that are
rapidly accumulating dollars and worried that their dollar holdings would lose value. EICHEN-
GREEN, supra note 4, at 50-51.
171. Id. at 52.
172. RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 82.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 83.
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continue this policy and to play its full part in contributing to in-
ternational monetary cooperation.175
But, even with German cooperation, the dollar continued to suffer
from external pressure as other countries relentlessly exercised their right
to gold claims against the dollar. By March 1968, the Gold Pool collapsed.
At $35 per ounce, gold was now valued too low–indeed the problem was
“an excess of paper money in relation to gold [and] [t]his excess money
was reflected in rising inflation in the U.S., the United Kingdom and
France.”176 With a gold shortage at the price of $35 per ounce, the IMF
eventually had no choice but to create a new form of international reserve
asset called the special drawing right (SDR),177 an asset unbacked by gold
or any other tangible commodity and allocated to members in accordance
with their IMF quotas. It was “linked to gold at a value equal to one U.S.
dollar.”178 Referred to as “paper gold,” it was an asset that could be used
to address balance of payments deficits in the same way that gold or re-
serve currencies had been used.179
On August 15, 1971, however, reality set in. Even allied countries were
worried and rumor had it that the Bank of England had requested Ameri-
can guarantees against devaluation of its $3 billion holdings or had asked
for conversion of its dollars into gold.180 H.R. Haldeman, President
Nixon’s Chief of Staff, wrote in his diary that “if we gave it to them, other
countries might follow suit. If we didn’t, they might wonder if we had
enough gold to support the dollar. In either case, it was a major crisis.”181
President Richard Nixon declared that the United States would close
the gold window. Referred to as the Nixon Shock, this move meant that
the United States would no longer convert dollars held by foreign central
banks to gold, or any other reserve assets and that it would no longer
intervene in the market to maintain the par value of the dollar against
gold.182 By July 1973, the central banks stopped intervening in the markets
to maintain any particular exchange rate and all the major currencies were
175. Id.
176. Id. at 84-85.
177. EICHENGREEN, supra note 4, at 56-57. At French insistence, the term “Special
Drawing Rights” was used instead of “reserve drawing rights” to emphasize that the new unit
was not a currency but a loan subject to repayment and thus could not be inflationary.
178. Id. at 56.
179. Id. at 56-57. SDRs have their own limitations. They can only be used in transac-
tions with other governments and with the IMF as they are not available for use between
governments and private parties. In addition, before SDRs can be issued members holding
85% of the voting power in the IMF had to agree. This was a provision designed to protect
against the danger of excessive liquidity creation.
180. KWARTENG, supra note 22, at 217.
181. Id. at 217-18 (quoting H.R. HALDEMAN, THE HALDEMAN DIARIES 340 (1994)).
182. The ability of other holders of dollars to ask for conversion of dollar to gold ended
many years before. See RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 86.
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floating.183 The IMF declared the death of Bretton Woods, which “offi-
cially ended the role of gold in international finance and left currency val-
ues to fluctuate against one another at whatever level governments or the
markets desired.”184
Despite the collapse of gold convertibility, dollar dominance was
nonetheless maintained because Nixon was able to modify the system to
prevent the dollar from becoming “simply paper money.” As Representa-
tive Ron Paul put it,
a new system was devised which allowed the U.S. to operate the
printing presses for the world reserve currency, with no restraints
placed on it . . . . U.S. authorities struck an agreement with OPEC
to price oil in U.S. dollars exclusively for all worldwide transac-
tions. This gave the dollar a special place among world currencies,
in essence backed the dollar with oil. In return, the U.S. promised
to protect the various oil-rich kingdoms in the Persian Gulf
against threat or invasion or domestic coup.185
Nixon’s decision to decouple the dollar from gold was the culmination
of a “long dark period for macroeconomic policy” which began in the
1960s186 when the U.S. embarked on a policy of lax budgets and chronic
deficit finance.187 The economist Cristina Romer, former chairperson of
the Council of Economic Advisors in the Obama Administration, has
warned about the danger of “persistent peacetime deficits.”188 Even
though 1950s policy makers recognized that “slavish adherence to a bal-
anced budget” could be counterproductive, “they also believed that persis-
tent deficits were inappropriate and that policy should aim for balance, ‘if
not every individual year, then surely over a term of very few years.’”189
But, from the 1960s through the present, “[t]he revolution in economic
183. Keep in mind that although “the exchange rates were now different, the system
was otherwise the same. Other currencies were still pegged to the dollar, the only difference
now being that the U.S. Treasury no longer stood ready to convert dollars into gold for for-
eign central banks and governments.” EICHENGREEN, supra note 4, at 61-63.
184. RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 92.
185. 152 Cong. Rec. H319 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 2006) (statement of Rep. Paul).
186. KWARTENG, supra note 22, at 202 (quoting Christina D. Romer, Economics Pro-
fessor, University of California Berkeley, Macroeconomic Policy in the 1960s: The Causes
and Consequences of a Mistaken Revolution, Presented at Plenary Session A of the Eco-
nomic History Association Annual Meeting, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library (Sept.
7, 2007) (transcript available at http://eml.berkeley.edu/~cromer/MacroPolicy.pdf).
187. By contrast, Presidents Truman and Eisenhower were both in principle committed
to balanced budgets. Id. at 202-04.
188. Christina D. Romer, Economics Professor, University of California Berkeley,
Macroeconomic Policy in the 1960s: The Causes and Consequences of a Mistaken Revolu-
tion, Presented at Plenary Session A of the Economic History Association Annual Meeting,
Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library (Sept. 7, 2007) (transcript available at http://
eml.berkeley.edu/~cromer/MacroPolicy.pdf).
189. Id. (quoting 1956 ECON. REP. PRESIDENT 73).
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beliefs was strongest among fiscal policymakers”190 who believe essen-
tially that deficits would take care of themselves.191
William McChesney Martin, the ninth and longest-serving Fed chair-
man, serving from 1951 to 1970 under five presidents, warned that it is not
possible to “have stability and sustained growth without some basis of
sound currency . . . . That is why the U.S. has the Federal Reserve System,
and why the Federal Reserve is charged with the duty of doing all it can,
within its limited powers, to help maintain the dollar’s value.”192 As Mar-
tin cautioned in 1967, “[w]hen we fall into the habit of perpetual deficit
financing the soundness of our currency and the strength of our economy
will eventually be undermined,”193 in which case, the international system
too will lose confidence in the dollar.194 Indeed, in 1965, when French
President De Gaulle called for the dollar’s reserve status to be replaced by
gold, it would have meant that the United States would not be able to pay
its foreign debt in its own currency but would have to do so in gold.195
With the demise of the dollar-gold conversion commitment, the inter-
national system shifted to a system of flexible exchange rates, referred to
by then German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt as “‘a floating non-sys-
tem.’”196 Currencies are not pegged to any gold value and freely floated
against each other, like any other commodity. The IMF Articles of Agree-
ment were amended to reflect this new reality. Under Article IV of the
original Articles of Agreement, each member state had been required to
maintain its currency within a narrow band around its stated par value in
terms of gold or the U.S. dollar which was at the time tied to gold. Under
190. Id. (“The 1950s emphasis on the benefits of fiscal discipline was replaced by a view
that deficits, even over several years, could be salutary. Moreover, policymakers expressed
confidence that deficits would largely take care of themselves by generating rapid growth and
hence increased revenues.”).
191. Id. (“Budget deficits would largely take care of themselves by generating faster
growth and hence more revenue.”).
192. William McChesney Martin Jr., Chairman of the Fed. Reserve, Remarks Before
the Business Counsel in Hot Springs, Virginia (Oct. 17, 1969) (available at https://fraser.st
louisfed.org/scribd/?item_id=7946&filepath=%2Fdocs%2Fhistorical%2Fmartin%2Fmartin
69_1017.pdf#scribd-open).
193. William McChesney Martin Jr., Speech Before the Rotary Club of Toledo, Ohio, at
4 (June 26, 1967) (available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/scribd/?item_id=7920&
filepath=%2Fdocs%2Fhistorical%2Fmartin%2Fmartin67_0626.pdf#scribd-open).
194. See William McChesney Martin Jr., Chairman of the Fed. Reserve, Remarks
Before the Economic Club of Detroit (Mar. 18, 1968) (available at https://fraser.st
louisfed.org/docs/historical/martin/martin68_0318.pdf).
195. PAUL VIOTTI, THE DOLLAR AND NATIONAL SECURITY: THE MONETARY COMPO-
NENT OF HARD POWER 15 (2014). If De Gaulle’s gold standard had been adopted, the United
States would not be able to pay its foreign debt in its own currency, but would have to do so
in gold. Nor would it be able to maintain persistent and large trade deficits as it would run
out of gold. It would also mean U.S. consumers would need to reduce their purchases of
foreign goods. See KWARTENG, supra note 22, at 211.
196. KWARTENG, supra note 22, at 219 (citing JOEL KURTZMAN, THE DEATH OF
MONEY: HOW THE ELECTRONIC ECONOMY HAS DESTABILIZED THE WORLD’S MARKETS
AND CREATED FINANCIAL CHAOS 51 (1993)).
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the amended Articles, Article IV required only that member states avoid
manipulating exchange rates. They were allowed to maintain the value of
their currency (i) in terms of another currency or the Fund’s own currency,
the SDR (but not gold); (ii) in cooperative arrangements with other mem-
bers; or (iii) using any other exchange arrangements of the member’s
choice. Most developing countries chose option 1, to link with the US dol-
lar or to the currency of their former colonial power. The developed coun-
tries chose option iii.
Although the dollar had been devalued by its severance from gold,
devaluation had strategic benefits given growing trade deficits with Ger-
many and Japan.197 And, despite devaluation, there was still faith in the
U.S. dollar. Holding reserves still meant holding dollars. OPEC continued
to price oil in dollars, despite talks about pricing oil in a basket of curren-
cies.198 If there was dollar depreciation, it was because other currencies
appreciated, not because central banks sold their dollar holdings.199
Currency crises did arise, but they were for the most part nondollar
crises–the 1991 sterling crisis, the 1994 Mexico peso crisis, the 1997 East
Asia-Russia crisis. The nondollar crises strengthened the dollar as it was
viewed as a safe haven. The more the dollar survived through crises, the
more “[i]t seemed as though it would take either a collapse in growth or
the rise of a competing economic power–or both–to threaten the
supremacy of the dollar.”200 In 2010, the perfect storm occurred as the
factors identified above converged, deepening and widening preexisting
cracks.
III. CURRENT CURRENCY WARS
Today’s financial crisis is not just one in which one currency is deval-
ued against another or against gold. The risk is, rather, a massive loss of
confidence in paper currencies altogether and a flight in the long run to-
wards safe havens such as commodities or other hard assets. Part III con-
nects the dots–it looks at the causes of the financial crisis, the U.S.
response, international reaction, and its impact on the dollar-based system.
When countries, separately or concertedly, take certain measures to in-
crease their gold or hard commodities, or to repatriate gold holdings
stored elsewhere back home, or when they enter into agreements to en-
gage in regional trade using a currency other than the U.S. dollar, these
developments constitute a challenge to the U.S. dollar.
Despite U.S. trade deficits and budget deficits throughout the 1980s
and onward, the dollar perversely maintained its top dog status. This irony
prompted Otmar Emminger, the former President of the Bundesbank, to
bemoan in awe and frustration that the “the more the American budget
deficit and trade deficit increased, the higher rose the dollar. . . . What
197. RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 95-96.
198. EICHENGREEN, supra note 4, at 66.
199. Id. at 66-67.
200. RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 96-97.
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would have made all other currencies weak seemed to have strengthened
the dollar.”201 Even with the closure of the gold link, the dollar did not
become a “normal currency like all the others,”202 but rather, retained “its
unique role as a world currency.”203 Nonetheless, Emminger cautioned
that the “overpriced dollar will sooner or later have to decline to a more
normal level. The crucial question is whether this will become a ‘soft land-
ing’ or a ‘crash landing.’ ”204
In the 1980s, the dollar had no rival. Not so now.
Despite economic troubles in Greece and the Euro zone and the 2015
economic slowdown in China, things are different today. The U.S. budget
deficit, which ballooned because of tax cuts and increased war spending,
continues without solution in sight. Even in 2003, Alan Greenspan had
warned, “‘Far more urgent than tax cuts . . . was the need to address the
threat posed by the soaring new deficits.’”205 At the same time, the com-
bined GDP of the United States, the European Union and China together
constitute almost 60 percent of global GDP. Hence it is not surprising that
there are currently three major currencies in the world: the dollar, the
Euro, and the yuan.206
Part A looks at dollar-yuan rivalry and explores how this dysfunc-
tional relationship has serious implications for the international economic
system. Part B looks at challenges to the dollar’s singular reserve status.
A. Dollar-Yuan Rivalry
This section focuses on the currency war between the dollar and the
yuan (rather than the euro) for several reasons. First, unlike Western Eu-
ropean countries, China is a rival, not an ally of the United States. Second,
China is a rising global power with global ambitions, political, economic,
and monetary. Third, China has by word and deed taken steps to dethrone
the dollar. Moreover, it is not possible to understand fully the 2008 finan-
cial crisis and how it deepened the cracks in the system unless one under-
stands the dysfunctional relationship between the yuan and the dollar.
In the early as the 1980s, when export was a relatively small part of
Chinese GDP, the yuan was deemed to be overvalued.207 Partly to protect
its rule as a response to Tiananmen Square protests, the Communist Party
had placed primary importance on political stability,208 and consequently
on job creation, which meant the adoption of a robust export sector and
201. Emminger, supra note 1, at 18.
202. Id.
203. Id.; see also KWARTENG, supra note 22, at 255 (discussing Emminger, supra note
1).
204. Emminger, supra note 1, at 22.
205. KWARTENG, supra note 22, at 312 (quoting ALAN GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TUR-
BULENCE: ADVENTURES IN A NEW WORLD 238-39 (2008)).
206. RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 98-99.
207. Id. at 101.
208. Id. at 102-03; see KWARTENG, supra note 22, at 292 (“The Chinese . . . had always
maintained that their policy of pegging the yuan to the dollar was not ‘meant to favour ex-
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correspondingly a devalued yuan. China embraced six rounds of devalua-
tions over a ten–year period,209 succumbing to U.S. pressure for an up-
ward revaluation only in the administration of George W. Bush.210 As
incisively noted, “[f]or the Communist Party of China, the dollar-yuan peg
was an economic bulwark against another Tiananmen Square.”211
In a surprising move on August 11 and 12, 2015, after a long period of
pegging the yuan to the dollar at about 6.1-to-1, the Chinese government
allowed the yuan to fall steeply, with the Chinese currency dropping 1.8
percent, then an additional 1.6 percent against the dollar.212 This move
prompted additional angst in the United States as American officials
viewed the depreciation as an attempt by China yet again to boost its ex-
ports to gain an unfair trade advantage.213 China shrugged off criticism,
arguing that it was anticipating IMF inclusion of the yuan in the SDR in
late 2015 and was merely allowing the yuan to be freely usable. China’s
devaluation this time was done under the convenient cover of market
forces.214
The devalued yuan has had a significant impact on U.S. monetary pol-
icy. In 2002, then Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan began a sustained period
of extremely low interest rates, adopting a 4.75 percent cut from July 2000
to July 2002, to accomplish several objectives. 215 Certainly one of the
objectives was to offset the technology bubble collapse in the United
States. But another objective was to counteract China’s monetary policy,
which critics charged included “exporting its deflation to the world, partly
through a steady supply of cheap labor.”216 A devalued yuan, resulting in
cheap export goods and falling prices, can cause persistent deflation be-
cause businesses and consumers tend to wait for prices to fall further and
ports over imports, but instead to foster economic stability by tying its currency to the U.S.
dollar at a constant level.’”).
209. RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 101.
210. KWARTENG, supra note 22, at 296-97.
211. RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 102.
212. Neil Irwin, The More China’s Currency Falls, the More It Looks Like a ‘Currency
War’, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2015 [hereinafter Irwin, The More China’s Currency Falls]. The
yuan selloff prompted the Chinese government to issue assurances that “currently there is no
basis for persistent depreciation” of the currency, followed by the central bank stepping in to
buy yuan to offset the declines. Id.
213. A depreciated yuan would boost Chinese exports and might cause other countries
to devalue their currencies. This would weaken U.S. exports and slow the U.S. economic
recovery. A yuan depreciation could also hamper any plans the federal government has to
raise interest rates. Keith Bradsher, China’s Currency Move Clouds its Policy Goals, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2015.
214. Neil Irwin, Why Did China Devalue Its Currency? Two Big Reasons, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 11, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/12/upshot/why-did-china-devalue-its-currency
-two-big-reasons.html?action=click&contentCollection=the%20Upshot&module=related
Coverage&region=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article [hereinafter Irwin, Why Did China De-
value Its Currency?] (devaluing the yuan “to link the currency’s value a bit more closely to
market forces”).
215. RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 103-04.
216. Id.
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hence spending is deferred.217 To spur American spending, the Fed kept
rates low.
But, Greenspan’s low rate policy created conditions that contributed
to the 2008 financial crisis and to the subsequent massive printing of U.S.
dollars by the Fed. Predictably, a policy of sustained low interest rates
meant that even marginal borrowers would be able to finance dubious
deals. It also meant that institutional investors would seek higher yield and
higher returns (and venture into the realm of the higher risk instruments)
than those offered in risk-free government securities,218 resulting in an ex-
plosion of subprime residential and commercial loan originations and
securitizations. These two linked factors, marginal borrowers and the
housing market bubble, are two factors that were at the crux of the 2008
financial crisis.219
Conversely, low interest rates and the U.S. government’s antidote to
the 2008 financial crisis–creating new money–also contributed to the fi-
nancial crisis in China and elsewhere. This is because the yuan’s exchange
rate has been pegged to the dollar.220 This means that China does not
allow the yuan to trade freely on international exchange markets in the
same way that convertible currencies such as the dollar, euro, sterling, or
yen do. The PBOC tightly controls the use of the yuan as a means for
settling transactions. For example, because the dollar is the world’s reserve
currency, a Chinese exporter would likely be paid in dollars by purchasers
of their export goods or services. The Chinese exporter cannot exchange
those dollars for the yuan on its own but must hand over those convertible
currencies to the PBOC in exchange for yuan, at a fixed official (pegged)
rate. Conversely, when an exporter needs euros or dollars to pay for im-
ports, it can get them via the PBOC, but just what is needed to pay for the
imports.
Historically, as Chinese exports grew and China received dollars as
payment, the PBOC in turn began buying dollars and dollar assets to
achieve several objectives. As widely noted, the Chinese “central bank is a
major purchaser of U.S. financial assets, largely because of its exchange
rate policy. In order to limit the appreciation of China’s currency, the
renminbi (RMB), against the dollar, China must purchase U.S. dollars”221
because boosting the dollar makes the yuan weak in comparison. Alterna-
217. Heather Stewart, China’s Currency Devaluation Could Spark “Tidal Wave of De-
flation,” THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 12, 2015.
218. KWARTENG, supra note 22, at 319-23.
219. Id. at 322-32.
220. In January 2016, Fang Xinghai, a senior economic adviser to the Chinese leader-
ship, said the government would “manage the yuan according to its performance against a
basket of global currencies, as opposed to just setting it against the U.S. dollar.” Lingling Wei
& Jon Hilsenrath, China Trying to Allay Global Concerns About Its Currency Regime, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 21, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-serious-about-move-to-unpeg-yuan-
from-u-s-dollar-says-official-1453372857.
221. Wayne M. Morrison & Marc Labonte, China’s Holdings of U.S. Securities: Implica-
tions for the U.S. Economy, at 1 (CRS Report for Congress, Jan. 9, 2008). Note that the RMB
is also known as the yuan.
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tively, intervention to achieve yuan depreciation is important because a
low yuan makes Chinese exports competitive, and thus fits into China’s
policy of export promotion. Third, the government saw the accumulation
of dollar reserves as an important cushion against the kind of economic
havoc wreaked by the 1997–1998 Asian currency crisis.222
For those reasons, the PBOC has embarked on a path of dollar ac-
cumulation. However, the picture is more complicated because a strategy
of dollar accumulation itself required an ancillary strategy of yuan print-
ing. This is because the PBOC used surplus dollars to buy
newly printed yuan. This meant that as the Fed printed dollars and
those dollars ended up in China to purchase goods, the PBOC had
to print yuan to soak up the surplus. In effect, China had out-
sourced its monetary policy to the Fed, and as the Fed printed
more, the PBOC also printed more in order to maintain the
pegged exchange rate.223
PBOC acquisition of dollars resulted in even more dollar exposure for
China. Once the PBOC held those newly acquired dollars, it also needed
to invest these dollar reserves224 and given its traditionally conservative
orientation, it preferred to invest in highly liquid securities issued by the
U.S. Treasury. Consequently, China possessed a massive quantity of U.S.
Treasury obligations, which was estimated by some sources as early as
2011 as $950 billion U.S. dollars.225
Chinese appetite for dollar assets was a double-edged sword. It was
good for the United States, as it ensured that U.S. bond yields could re-
main low because a highly desirable U.S. debt market meant that the
United States could command lower interest rates. As a Congressional
Research Service report observed, “[b]ecause of its low savings rate, the
United States borrows to finance the federal budget deficit and its private
capital needs. . . . It therefore depends on countries with high savings rates,
such as China, to invest some of their capital in the United States.”226 Any
sign that China may reduce its purchase of dollar-based assets and diver-
sify into other debt instruments would be worrying because “China could
222. Niall Ferguson & Moritz Schularick, The End of Chimerica 5 (Harv. Bus. Sch.
Working Paper No. 10-037, 2009), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/10-037
.pdf. In July 1997, the value of the Thai Baht fell dramatically and would have fallen even
more had the Thai government not sharply raised interest rate to defend the currency. This
hurt Thai businesses that had dollar debt. The debt became more onerous because the num-
ber of baht needed to convert into dollars to repay the dollar debt had skyrocketed. Quan B.
Lai, Currency Crisis in Thailand: The Leading Indicators, 8 THE PARK PLACE ECONOMIST 66,
66-69 (2008) https://www.iwu.edu/economics/PPE08/quan.pdf.
223. RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 106.
224. “Rather than hold dollars (and other foreign currencies), which earn no interest,
the Chinese central government has converted some level of its foreign exchange reserve
holdings into U.S. financial securities.” Morrison & Labonte, supra note 221, at 1.
225. RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 106.
226. Morrison & Labonte, supra note 221, at 1; see also Alan Greenspan, U.S. Debt and
the Greece Analogy, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2010.
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use [its dollar holdings] of U.S. debt as a bargaining chip in its dealing with
the United States.”227
But, as economists Ferguson and Schularick have described, this has
created a dysfunctional this “world economic order that combined Chi-
nese export-led development with US over-consumption.”228 Ben
Bernanke argued that a “‘glut’ of savings from emerging markets was a
key factor in the decline of U.S. and global real-long term interest
rates . . . .”229 Low interest rates allowed Americans to consume more and
“worsened the imbalance between savings and investment.”230 Others ob-
served that without “Chinese willingness to fund America’s consumption
and real estate speculation habit, long-term interest rates in the U.S.
would almost certainly have been substantially higher, acting as a circuit
breaker for the housing bubble.”231
When the financial crisis hit the United States in 2008, it was clear that
urgent action was needed. The traditional approach to strengthening a
weak economy in the United States has been to increase consumer spend-
ing.232 U.S. GDP was $14.9 trillion in 2011, with seventy-one percent com-
ing from consumer consumption, twelve percent from investment, twenty
percent from government spending, and minus three percent from net ex-
ports, which means that the consumer has always played a vital economic
role.233 Interestingly, this picture is the mirror image of the GDP composi-
tion of China, where consumption was only thirty-eight percent of the Chi-
nese economy, net exports less than four percent and investment forty-
eight percent. Consumption remained low in China because its social
safety net is weak, forcing individuals to save for their own health care and
retirement.234
For the United States, the usual recipe to invigorate consumer spend-
ing has been a “combination of low interest rates, easier mortgage terms,
wealth effects from a rising stock market and credit card debt,”235 but with
an overstretched consumer, high unemployment, mortgage default, and
business reluctance to invest,236 the Bush and Obama administrations
turned to government spending. However, faced with vociferous Tea Party
resistance, the Obama administration looked to export, aiming to double
227. Morrison & Labonte, supra note 221, at 7 (CRS Report for Congress, Jan. 9, 2008).
228. Ferguson & Schularick, supra note 222, at 2; see also KWARTENG, supra note 22, at
317.
229. Ferguson & Schularick, supra note 222, at 6.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 128.
233. Id. at 128-29.
234. Id. at 129-30.
235. Id. at 128-29.
236. Id. High U.S. corporate tax rate also meant many corporations kept their earnings
offshore so that new investment took place outside the United States and did not count
towards U.S. GDP.
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U.S. exports in five years to spur growth.237 Export could be a strategy if
China would agree to rebalance and focus more on consumption–by im-
porting from the United States.
The IMF was summoned by the G20 to support the “rebalancing,”
agenda which the IMF described as playing “a critical role in promoting
global financial stability and rebalancing growth.”238 But despite persis-
tent IMF and U.S. pressure,239 China did not allow the yuan to appreciate.
By June 2009, the United States, its patience wearing thin, adopted a
different currency strategy some called “a secret weapon”–QE.240 As in
1971, when the United States acted unilaterally to weaken the dollar, start-
ing in 2009 the United States was able to increase the money supply and
increase asset prices via QE. The Fed could have lowered the price of
money by cutting interest rates but it opted instead to increase the supply
of money. It accomplishes this objective “by going into the financial mar-
kets to buy assets and . . . [creating] new money to pay for them.”241 Ac-
cording to the Fed, “[t]he new money swells the size of bank reserves in
the economy by the quantity of assets purchased—hence ‘quantitative’
easing.”242
As John C. Williams, who became the president of the Federal Re-
serve Bank at San Francisco in 2011 explained,
if the Fed buys significant quantities of longer-term Treasury se-
curities or mortgage-backed securities, then the supply of those
securities available to the public falls. As supply falls, the prices of
those securities rise and their yields decline. The effects extend to
other longer-term securities. Mortgage rates and corporate bond
yields fall as investors who sold securities to the Fed invest that
money elsewhere. Hence, LSAPs [large scale asset purchases]
drive down a broad range of longer-term borrowing rates. And
lower rates get households and businesses to spend more than
they otherwise would, boosting economic activity.243
But, QE in the United States also affected other countries. As John
Williams has acknowledged,
237. Id. at 129-30.
238. International Monetary Fund, Pittsburg G-20 Summit, G-20 Backs Sustained Crisis
Response, Shift in IMF Representation, Sept. 29, 2009, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
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2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-29778331.
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nomic-letter/2012/november/federal-reserve-unconventional-policies.
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although it’s not our main intention, these unconventional policies
have also had an effect on the dollar versus foreign currencies.
When interest rates in the U.S. fall relative to rates in other coun-
tries, the dollar tends to decline as money flows to foreign markets
with higher returns. One estimate is that a $600 billion program
like QE2 causes the dollar to fall by roughly 3 or 4% . . . . That
helps stimulate the U.S. economy by making American goods
more competitive at home and abroad.244
Again, take China as an example. Much of the money the Fed printed
via QE “found its way to China in the form of trade surpluses or hot
money inflows looking for higher profits than were available in the United
States.”245 QE put more dollars into circulation, hence diluting the value
of the dollar. Because the dollar is the world’s reserve currency, many
products, particularly commodities, are priced in dollars. Therefore, when
the dollar depreciates, the price of commodities appreciates. This affects
many countries such as China because the Chinese economy is heavily de-
pendent on purchasing raw materials and using them to make products for
exports. China’s trade minister, Chen Deming, said, “[u]ncontrolled print-
ing of dollars and rising international prices for commodities are causing
an imported inflationary ‘shock’ for China and are a key factor behind
increasing uncertainty.”246
In the end, the United States got what exactly it wanted: if China re-
fused to revalue the yuan, it would get U.S.-exported inflation instead.247
Both Chinese revaluation of the yuan and U.S.-exported inflation would
serve U.S. interests because both increased the costs of Chinese exports,
which in turn made U.S. exports more competitive.248 In many ways, for
China, inflation induced by QE is worse than revaluation. China could
control revaluation, choosing when to revalue. But inflation would be
harder to control—it “could have huge behavioral impacts and start to
feed on itself in a self-fulfilling cycle as merchants and wholesalers raised
prices in anticipation of price increases by others.”249
As proof of QE success for the U.S. economy, Bernanke pointed to
the 25% increase in U.S. equity prices, which began from the beginning of
QE2 in August 2010, to the end of February 2011.250 For the United
States, this was a good development—“the Fed intended for the ‘excess’
244. Id.
245. RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 135.
246. Ben Baden, Why China Has a Point About Quantitative Easing, U.S. NEWS (Oct.
29, 2010), http://money.usnews.com/money/business-economy/articles/2010/10/29/why-china-
has-a-point-about-quantitative-easing.
247. For the United States, however, inflation is contained because the United States
gets cheap imports from trade. RICKARDS, DEATH OF MONEY, supra note 27, at 75.
248. RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 135-36.
249. Id. at 136.
250. Robert Barone, Fed Exports Inflation, Stokes Revolution, FORBES, Mar. 8, 2011.
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liquidity to push up asset prices, probably hoping that the ‘wealth effect’ of
higher asset prices would spur economic activity in the U.S.”251
But for other countries, “the impact of QE on commodities and the
food and energy inflation that it may have inadvertently, or perhaps pur-
posefully, engendered”252 have created havoc. Thus, when the Fed low-
ered interest rate to zero and pursued QE, its action had cross-border
effects not just because more dollars flooding the market devalues the dol-
lars, causing energy and commodities that are often priced in dollars to
cost more (because it requires more dollars to buy them). Rather, inflation
can also occur when large capital inflow fuels those economies, driving up
demand for resources or further spurring speculation in commodities, in-
creasing demand and prices.253
Moreover, placing the U.S. interest rate at zero means that U.S. inves-
tors seek higher returns elsewhere–in emerging markets—and in the pro-
cess drive up the value of many of the currencies even as QE drives down
the value of the dollar. In 2010 the Brazilian Finance Minister, Guido
Mantega, called this combustible situation of commodity inflation a “cur-
rency war” unleashed by U.S. QE. Indeed, “Brazil was stuck between the
rock of currency appreciation and the hard place of inflation.”254
Emerging countries have few options. Like China, they can peg their
currency to the dollar, protecting their export markets but suffering infla-
tion in the process. The PBOC’s money printing to maintain the yuan-
dollar peg quickly led to increased prices there with China importing infla-
tion from the United States (as opposed to having exported its deflation to
the United States previously).255 Inflation can have serious consequences
in emerging economies. Indeed, it was one of the catalysts of the 1989
Tiananmen Square protests. Trade surpluses and hot money in search of
higher yields meant dollar inflows into many emerging economies, causing
disruption in South Korea, Brazil, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and
elsewhere.256
Although the Fed has denied that its actions, particularly QE2, are a
driver of protests and revolutions abroad and admittedly, commodity
prices are influenced by a multiplicity of factors (desertification or
drought, for example), commentators have connected the dots between
the prices of food and purchase of U.S. Treasuries by the Fed.257 Data
showed that “the food price index broadly stabilised through late 2009 and
early 2010, then rose again from mid-2010 as quantitative easing was re-




254. RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 123.
255. Id. at 135.
256. Id. at 137.
257. Andrew Lilico, How the Fed Triggered the Arab Spring Uprisings in Two Easy
Graphs, THE TELEGRAPH (May 4, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/
8492078/How-the-Fed-triggered-the-Arab-Spring-uprisings-in-two-easy-graphs.html.
98 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 38:57
period.”258 As in Tiananmen Square, a rapid rise in food prices also con-
tributed to disturbance and revolution in the Middle East.259 The Middle
East and North Africa, more than other regions, heavily depend on im-
ported food; in Egypt, for example, local food prices rose 37 percent.260 In
Jordan and Syria, food prices rose 59 percent.261 For the poor in the devel-
oping world, “rising food prices are the difference between eating and
starving, between life and death. The civil unrest, riots and insurrection
that erupted in Tunisia in early 2011 and quickly spread to Egypt, Jordan,
Yemen, Morocco, Libya and beyond were as much a reaction to rising
food and energy prices and lower standards of living as they were to dicta-
torships and lack of democracy.”262 It is thus not surprising that Mohamad
Bouazizi, the Tunisian whose self-immolation triggered the Arab Spring
protests, was a food vendor. Hence even as China hangs on to its export
model and its purposely devalued yuan, and even as the United States
continues to “inflate away China’s export cost advantage,”263 inflation
could not be confined “only” to China.
To put China’s dollar holdings into historical perspective, if the Bret-
ton Woods system were still anchored to gold, one could safely assume
that China would have opted to cash in some of its Treasury securities for
U.S. gold held in reserves. A redemption of $100 billion of Treasury notes
at the 2008 gold price of $1000 per ounce would have equaled 35 percent
of the entire official gold supply of the United States; and a full redemp-
tion of all U.S. government securities held by China would have wiped out
all of the U.S. gold supply.264 The question is how China can protect its
own dollar holdings and still diversify from its dollar-based assets. When
“the U.S. government announced a $1.5 billion budget deficit and the Fed-
eral Reserve decided to buy hundreds of billions of government and
agency debt” in 2009, China quickly questioned the continued use of the
dollar as an international reserve currency.265
Some have warned about the looming currency wars.266 After the
2008 financial crisis and the “unprecedented explosion of financial
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Rami Zurayk, Use Your Loaf: Why Food Prices Were Crucial in the Arab Spring,
THE GUARDIAN (July 16, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2011/jul/17/bread-
food-arab-spring.
261. Radi Khasawnay, Is the West to Blame for Middle East Unrest, FIN. NEWS (Feb. 1,
2011), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2011-02-01/qe-blame-unrest?mod=sectionhead
lines-AM-IB.
262. RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS, supra note 50, at 138.
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264. Id. at 107-08.
265. Ferguson & Schularick, supra note 222, at 24.
266. See Edieth Y. Wu, Recent Developments in the Currency War: The Euro, the Dol-
lar, the Yen, and the BEMU, 15 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2000). See generally RICKARDS, CUR-
RENCY WARS, supra note 50.
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credit,”267 concern about the prevalence of paper money became even
more pronounced. History has shown that “paper currencies, not backed
by any commodity standard, had facilitated unprecedented credit expan-
sion.”268 And as some have observed, “paradoxically, the paper which had
been responsible in large part for the explosive increase in credit was now
seen to provide the solution.”269
At present, dangerous fault lines exist beneath the dollar-based inter-
national economic system. Part B connects the dots, so to speak, to high-
light seemingly disconnected events which demonstrate dissatisfaction
with the way the United States handles the dollar. It also examines actions
being pursued by China and other countries to chip away at dollar domi-
nance and to create alternatives to the status quo.
B. NEW NON-DOLLAR BASED SYSTEMS
This Part examines three main developments that signal not just
global disillusionment with the dollar generally but concrete actions to cre-
ate alternatives to the dollar-based system particularly. Some are a partic-
ular reaction to U.S. initiated currency wars and others reflect a general
disillusionment with the dollar: 1) the historic 2014 multi-billion dollar gas
deal between Russia and China which should be seen as one of many ef-
forts to diminish the dollar’s role in oil and gas pricing, that is, to eradicate
the dollar’s privilege as a currency backed by oil; 2) the establishment of a
development bank by BRICS to challenge the Western dominated World
Bank and IMF; and 3) the search for commodities of intrinsic value such
as gold to challenge fiat money such as the dollar.
First, as noted in the Introduction, the United States itself has un-
leashed financial warfare against Iran and its currency, the rial. The
United States severed Iran from the international banking and payments
system, barring Iran from receiving dollars for oil exports and sending dol-
lars out to pay for needed imports. Iranian merchants faced with dollar
shortage turned to the black market, exchanging rials for dollars at astro-
nomically depressed rates. Depositors rushed to withdraw their rials to
purchase hard assets and dollars or other hard currencies. To prevent a
bank run, the government had little choice but to raise interest rates to
induce depositors to keep their money in the banks. One of Iran’s largest
crude oil buyers, India, capitulated to U.S. pressure and shut down its pri-
mary financing facility used to pay for Iranian oil.270
Iran has turned to China for financing help with ambitious projects
and for trade when faced with Western sanctions. Iran and China have
267. KWARTENG, supra note 22, at 319. Of course, there were other commentators who
had warned about “reckless credit expansion” before the 2008 crisis. See, e.g., PETER
WARBURTON, DEBT AND DELUSION: CENTRAL BANK FOLLIES THAT THREATEN ECONOMIC
DISASTER 11 (2000).
268. KWARTENG, supra note 22, at 321.
269. Id. at 342.
270. Jay Solomon, U.S. Cuts Iran Cash Pipeline, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203833004577251751961073104.
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started on building a new Silk Road and China is now Iran’s largest trad-
ing partner.271 Iran also sells its oil to China, taking care to avoid violating
U.S. banking laws by using Russian and Chinese banks and by bar-
tering.272 It entered into an oil-for-gold swap with India, whereby India
would buy gold and swap it with Iran for oil. Iran would in turn swap the
gold with Russia or China for food and other goods.
Iran is also selling crude oil to China, taking yuan as payment.273 It
has also pursued a gold strategy, expanding its gold trading with Afghani-
stan, the UAE, and Turkey.274 To keep the United States from freezing its
dollar balances, it dumped dollars and bought gold. In July 2013, to deal
with Iranian circumvention of U.S. banking sanctions, the United States
banned gold sales to Iran; gold traders in other countries who flouted this
regulation would risk U.S. penalties, including expulsion from the U.S.
precious metals market.275
Any movement away from the oil for dollar system–either by using
gold or a non-dollar currency–will be a serious threat to dollar hegemony.
Dissatisfaction with dollarization of the international oil market has been
bubbling for many years. For example, before the U.S. invasion of Iraq,
Saddam Hussein made the switch from the dollar to the euro for oil trad-
ing, in a move intended as both retribution for U.S. sanctions and as en-
couragement of Europeans to challenge such sanctions.276 Representative
Ron Paul asserted a controversial and scantily noticed link between the
invasion of Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s rejection of the dollar: “Hussein
demanded Euros for his oil. His arrogance was a threat to the dollar; his
lack of any military might was never a threat. . . . I doubt it was the only
reason, but it may well have played a significant role in our motivation to
wage war.”277 Others have asserted a similar link between the ouster of
Gaddafi and his plan to refuse the dollar as payment for oil, insisting in-
stead on a new currency, the gold dinar. Gaddafi fell out of favor with the
United States when he “suggested establishing a united African continent,
with its 200 million people using this single currency. During the past year,
271. Thomas Erdbrink, China Deepens its Footprint in Iran After Lifting of Sanctions,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/25/world/middleeast/china-deep
ens-its-footprint-in-iran-after-lifting-of-sanctions.html?_r=0.
272. Id. (describing transactions “that avoided traditional banking routes” and ensuring
that they do not “violate United States sanctions on banking transactions . . .”).
273. China Buying Oil from Iran with Yuan, BBC (May 8, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/
news/business-17988142.
274. RICKARDS, DEATH OF MONEY, supra note 27, at 55-56.
275. Rick Gladstone, New Sanctions Imposed on Iran to Halt Gold Trading, N.Y. TIMES
(July 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/world/middleeast/new-sanctions-imposed-
on-iran-to-halt-gold-trading.html?_r=0.
276. Iraq: Baghdad Moves to Euro, RADIO FREE EUROPE (Nov. 1, 2000), http://
rferl.org/content/article/1095057.html.
277. Bart Gruzalski, Attempt to Pre-empt the Post-Dollar World, FOREIGN POL’Y NEWS
(June 15, 2015), http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/06/15/attempt-to-pre-empt-the-post-dollar-
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the idea was approved by many Arab countries and most African
countries.”278
In a little noticed 2002 speech to OPEC, Javad Yarjani, a senior Ira-
nian oil diplomat, floated the possibility that oil could be priced in eu-
ros.279 Since then it is establishing an oil bourse that will trade oil in
currencies other than the dollar.280 The former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi
Arabia, Chas Freeman, testified before a congressional committee that:
One of the major things the Saudis have historically done, in part
out of friendship with the United States, is to insist that oil contin-
ues to be priced in dollars. Therefore, the US Treasury can print
money and buy oil, which is an advantage no other country has.
With the emergence of other currencies and with strains in the
relationship, I wonder whether there will not again be, as there
have been in the past, people in Saudi Arabia who raise the ques-
tion of why they should be so kind to the United States.281
The dollar faces serious threats from rivals. The erosion of dollar he-
gemony has geopolitical implications because “non-dollar trading–which
enables countries to bypass U.S. claims to legal jurisdiction–will transform
the prospects facing Iran and Syria, particularly in the field of energy
reserves, and deeply affect Iraq which is situated between the two.”282 As
Russia faced sanctions over its actions in Crimea and Ukraine, President
Putin of Russia announced in August 2014 that Russia will aim to sell its
oil and gas for rubles globally to bypass dollar monopoly in energy trade.
“We should act carefully. At the moment we are trying to agree with some
countries to trade in national currencies,” Putin said during his visit to
Crimea, annexed from Ukraine in 2014.283
Secret meetings have reportedly been held among financial officials of
China, Russia, Japan and France to end dollar dealings for oil, moving
278. David Swanson, Libya: Another Neocon War, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 21, 2011),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/apr/21/libya-muammar-gaddafi.
279. Faisal Islam, When Will We Buy Oil in Euros, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 2003),
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280. Garry White, Iran Presses Ahead with Dollar Attack, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 12,
2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/commodities/9077600/Iran-presses-ahead-with-dol
lar-attack.html.
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SHIP 254 (2009) (statement of Chas Freeman, former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia).
Tension has escalated between the two countries. Mark Mazzetti, Saudi Arabia Warns of
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passes-9-11-bill.html (noting the Saudi government’s warning to the United States that it
would dump $750 billion in treasury securities and other assets if the U.S. Congress passed a
bill allowing the Saudi government to be sued in U.S. courts over 9/11).
282. Alastair Crooke, Non-Dollar Trading Is Killing the Petrodollar—And the Founda-
tion of U.S.-Saudi Policy in the Middle East, THE WORLD POST (Dec. 2, 2014), http://
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283. Putin Says Russia Should Aim to Sell Energy in Roubles, REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2014).
102 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 38:57
instead to a basket of currencies including the Japanese yen and Chinese
yuan, the euro, gold and a new, unified currency planned for nations in the
Gulf Co-operation Council, including Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait
and Qatar.284 The dollar’s replacement, according to Chinese banking
sources, is, not surprisingly, gold.285
Interestingly, analysts in the oil and gas industry find diversification
away from petrodollars to be a natural development given the reality of
trade. One reason might simply be that many countries such as China,
Russia and those in the Middle East already have large dollar holdings and
wish to diversify into other currencies.286 Moreover, as bilateral trade be-
tween China and other countries grows, or as China and Russia trade oil,
“why would they want to do that solely in dollars?”287 And indeed, move-
ments are underway between China and Russia to carve an alternative
natural-resource universe denominated in a non-dollar currency, most
likely the yuan. The newest linkage between China and Russia—barely
two months after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, is an his-
toric $400 billion gas agreement for the construction of a pipeline and the
transportation of natural gas from Russia to Western China over the next
several decades.288
The cost of construction and processing facilities is estimated at $70
billion, although it will be partially offset by a multi-billion loan from
China in exchange for a discount in the purchase price.289 China is “the
largest energy consumer and producer in the world. Rapidly increasing
energy demand, especially for petroleum and other liquids, has made
China influential in world energy markets.”290 The gas deal cements “the
two partners as a counterhegemonic bloc to the West.”291
Analysts “predict that the oil exports would mean Chinese yuan being
exchanged directly, into the Russian ruble. Thus, the two countries would
bypass the U.S. dollar–the traditional currency used in oil trades and con-
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sidered to be the international reserve currency of choice.”292 Russia’s
willingness to accept yuan as payment for its oil has made it the number
one oil supplier for China.293 Although, as noted, China’s stock market
and currency fluctuated wildly in early 2016, it would be wrong to see the
yuan as a weakened currency.294 It has been included in the SDR basket
as a global reserve. Thus, the yuan will be more international and its value
will appreciate as central banks increase their yuan holdings,295 following
signals by the central banks of Korea, Philippines and Indonesia that they
plan to increase their own yuan reserves.296 As early as 2010, Nigeria, an-
ticipating greater yuan internationalization, announced that it would put a
tenth of its reserves, or $ 4 billion, into yuan.297 This past December 2015,
Zimbabwe announced it would make the yuan the official legal tender of
the country.298
Russian willingness to accept the yuan has been further reinforced by
Western sanctions against Russia for its conduct in the Ukraine and Cri-
mea. Although Western sanctions explicitly permitted the use of the dol-
lars and euros as payment for Russian oil and gas, “the sanctions triggered
alarm among Russian executives, who viewed the measures as a sign that
the west was willing to use currency as a weapon.”299 Consequently, Rus-
sian officials and executives have begun the shift from the U.S. dollar to
292. Matt Clinch, Will the U.S. Give the Dutch Their Gold Back?, CNBC (Nov. 28,
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the yuan as part of the Kremlin’s “pivot to Asia.”300 Gazprom Neft, Rus-
sia’s third largest oil producer and the oil arm of the state-owned Russian
gas company Gazprom, announced that since the beginning of 2015, it had
been selling its oil to China for yuan.301
Russian and Chinese monetary linkages have grown in other areas as
well. For example, VTB, Russia’s second biggest bank, entered into an
agreement with the Bank of China to pay each other in their respective
domestic currencies.302 The two countries have also announced that in bi-
lateral trades, they will no longer use the U.S. dollar, but will use their
respective domestic currencies instead.303 Trade between Russia and
China is already nearly $90 billion, and it is expected that using more local
currencies will speed up trade, which is scheduled to reach $200 billion in
the next six years.304 Cooperation between Russian and Chinese banks is
also increasing, as China’s state-owned Import Export Bank, has agreed to
help Russian banks cut off from Western capital markets as a result of
Western sanctions.305
Although there have been other attempts to isolate the dollar–for ex-
ample, agreements between China and India and China and Brazil306 and
China-Russia yuan-ruble swaps,307 the gas deal is in a different league al-
together. Because the deal is so huge, involves the world’s largest energy
importer, China, and the world’s largest energy producer, Russia, it
“threatens the global petro-currency status of the U.S. dollar. . . . In other
words, the growing importance of Russia and China in the global energy
300. Id.; see also James Marson & Andrey Ostroukh, Gazprom Secures $2.17 Billion
Loan from Bank of China, FORBES (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/gazprom-se
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picture – and their phasing out of dollar usage for trading energy commod-
ities – would marginalize the status of the dollar”308 and threaten its
unique status. The U.S. Treasury market would be weakened, which would
in turn make it difficult for the United States to continue financing its
chronic dollar-denominated debt of more than $17.5 trillion.309
Consequently, what we now have is “[a] . . . transformation of the
global monetary system . . . driven by a perfect storm: the need for Russia
and Iran to escape Western sanctions, the low interest rate policy of the . . .
Federal Reserve to keep the American economy afloat and the increasing
demand for Middle East oil by China.”310 As discussed later,311 hoarding
gold is thus becoming not just an investment strategy but also a financial
weapon.312
The China-Russia gas deal should also be viewed in a yet broader con-
text–the establishment of not just different reserve currencies to challenge
the dollar but also of an alternative system to challenge Bretton Woods. In
2014, exactly seventy years after the Bretton Woods summit, the govern-
ments of Brazil, Russia, India and China held a conference in Fortaleza,
Brazil to mark the establishment of a development bank that, “whatever
diplomatic niceties are put on it, is intent on competing with the IMF and
World Bank.”313
There are many reasons why the NDB was erected. BRICS, especially
China, have pushed for voting reform at the IMF to no avail, arguing that
voting powers are skewed in favor of Western Europe even though eco-
nomic conditions, as measured by population growth, foreign currency
reserves, and economic output, have changed significantly since the found-
ing of the IMF. As Joseph Stiglitz explained,314 the NDB fills a need. It
provides additional investment in trillions of dollars per year; and second,
because it reflects the increasing power of BRICS, it corrects the demo-
cratic deficit currently of the IMF and the World Bank.315
Regardless, the BRICS NDB was also established to challenge the
dollar-based system, or as euphemistically put, to “support the reform and
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BUS. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.ibtimes.com/china-russia-currency-agreement-further
-threatens-us-dollar-248338; see Halligan, The Dollar’s Dominance, supra note 9.
309. Halligan, The Dollar’s Dominance, supra note 9.
310. Crooke, supra note 282.
311. See infra text accompanying notes 325-78.
312. RICKARDS, DEATH OF MONEY, supra note 27, at 58.
313. Halligan, The Dollar’s Dominance, supra note 9. There is also the newly formed,
China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which the United States vociferously op-
posed. Despite intense lobbying against the bank by the United States, important allies such
as South Korea and Australia joined the bank nevertheless. Jane Perlez, U.S. Opposing
China’s Answer to World Bank, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/
10/world/asia/chinas-plan-for-regional-development-bank-runs-into-us-opposition.html?_r=0.
314. Interview with Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Economist Joseph Stiglitz Hails New BRICS
Bank Challenging U.S.-Dominated World Bank & IMF (July 17, 2014), http://www.democra-
cynow.org/2014/7/17/nobel_economist_joseph_stiglitz_hails_new.
315. Id.
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improvement of the international monetary system, with a broad-based
international reserve currency system providing stability and certainty. We
welcome the discussion about the role of the SDR in the existing interna-
tional monetary system including the composition of the SDR’s basket of
currencies.”316 As Russian Prime Minister Dimitri Medvedev said in 2014,
the efficacy of the Bretton Woods system had to be questioned after the
2008 financial crisis.317 “This is when we started wondering whether the
Bretton Woods system was enough, whether one powerful currency–the
US dollar–and several reserve currencies such as the euro, the pound and
others can support the entire global financial system.”318
With China and Russia renouncing the dollar in their bilateral
trade,319 and leading the charge, the BRICS countries, which collectively
hold over 50 percent of global currency, established a $100 billion develop-
ment bank as a “first concrete step toward reshaping the Western-domi-
nated international financial system.”320 BRICS leaders also signed
another agreement setting up a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA)
which is a reserve currency pool with $100 billion in initial capital.321 The
NDB, formally launched in 2015, will start with an initial paid-in-capital of
$50 billion, with each BRICS country contributing $10 billion. The initial
capital contribution of each participant to the CRA will vary depending on
its GDP,322 with reserves denominated not in dollars but in each country’s
currency.323 The NDB will finance infrastructure and sustainable develop-
ment projects (like the World Bank), and the CRA will provide assistance
to members in financial difficulty (like the IMF).324
Countries can also minimize dependency on the dollar-based sys-
tem–protecting themselves from sanctions and asset freezes–“by con-
verting its paper wealth to gold,”325 an option China and a few others have
been pursuing aggressively. China and India, Iran and Russia, among
others, have used their monetary reserves to increase their gold posi-
316. RICKARDS, DEATH OF MONEY, supra note 27, at 149.




319. Su Qiang & Li Xiaokun China, Russia Quit Dollar, CHINA DAILY (Nov. 24, 2010),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-11/24/content_11599087.htm.
320. Gruzalski, supra note 277.
321. Previous BRICS Summits, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF RUSSIA’S PRESIDENCY IN
BRICS, http://en.brics2015.ru/russia_and_brics/20150301/19545.html.
322. Jordan Totten, BRICS New Development Bank Threatens Hegemony of U.S. Dol-
lars, FORBES (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/12/22/brics-new-devel
opment-bank-threatens-hegemony-of-u-s-dollar/.
323. Id.
324. See Previous BRICS Summits, supra note 321.
325. RICKARDS, DEATH OF MONEY, supra note 27, at 61.
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tions.326 Gold plays an important role in China’s quest to internationalize
the yuan and position it as a preeminent reserve currency. One way to
accomplish this is to have it included in the IMF’s SDR basket, which
China achieved in November 2015 when the IMF deemed it a major ex-
porter with a “freely useable” currency increasingly driven by market
forces.327
Another step China has taken to acquire elite status for its currency
and to challenge dollar dominance in trade involves the acquisition of
gold. Gold still functions as a credible alternative and hence a challenge to
the dollar’s elite status. Even though gold is no longer used to back paper
money, central banks still hold gold as part of their bank reserves, with the
IMF alone holding 2,814 tons.328 Since 2010 when China became the
world’s second largest economy, the government has “stepped up efforts
to make the yuan a viable competitor to the dollar. That has led to specu-
lation the government has stockpiled gold as part of a plan to diversify
$3.7 trillion in foreign-exchange reserves.”329
In July 2015, China reversed years of secrecy and reported that it has
purchased 604 tons of gold since 2009, an amount second only to Rus-
sia.330 With this purchase representing an almost 60 percent increase in its
reserves since 2009,331 China displaced Russia as the world’s fifth-largest
holder of gold.332 “The purchases show how China is seeking to diversify
its reserves away from the US dollar at a time when the price of gold has
fallen to near its lowest price since 2010.”333
Unlike other big gold holders such as Germany and Russia, which up-
date gold holdings monthly,334 China does not regularly disclose data on
its gold reserves.335 The PBOC’s report of its addition of slightly more 600
326. Robert Lenzer, China and India Race to Amass Gold Reserves, FORBES (Dec. 3,
2010, 11:43 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/2010/12/03/china-and-india-race-
to-amass-gold-reserves/.
327. Bradsher, China’s Renminbi, supra note 75; see Irwin, Why Did China Devalue Its
Currency?, supra note 214.
328. Jasmine Ng et al., The Mystery of China’s Gold Stash May Soon Be Solved,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 20, 2015, 12:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-04-20/mystery-of-china-s-gold-stash-may-soon-be-solved-as-imf-beckons.
329. Id.
330. Eddie van der Walt & Luzi Ann Javier, China’s Been Hoarding Gold and it Isn’t
Likely to Stop, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 19, 2015, 7:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-07-19/china-s-no-longer-secret-hoarding-of-gold-may-not-be-finished.
331. China Breaks 6-Year Silence on Gold Reserves, FIN. TIMES (July 18, 2015, 12:31
AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/18/china-breaks-silence-on-gold-reserves.html.
332. Gordon G. Chang, Where is China’s Missing 1,850 Tons of Gold?, FORBES (July 19,
2015, 1:33 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2015/07/19/where-is-chinas-missing
-1850-tons-of-gold/.
333. China Breaks 6-Year Silence on Gold Reserves, supra note 331.
334. Van der Walt & Javier, supra note 330.
335. Henry Sanderson, China Reveals Increase in Gold Holdings, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 14,
2015, 10:14 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/942ac8ee-4260-11e5-b98b-87c7270955cf.html
#axzz4JrCWyURN (explaining that, in 2015, China started reporting its reserves under the
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tons of gold showed up, surprisingly, (or perhaps not) as one single entry
in June 2015.336 Such a huge purchase is difficult to accomplish in one
transaction unless it is prearranged between central banks or the IMF.337
As there was no record of such arrangement, “[t]he conclusion is ines-
capable that China is actually accumulating gold in smaller quantities over
long periods of time, and reporting the changes in a lump sum on an irreg-
ular basis.”338
The Chinese decision to reveal its gold holdings in 2015 might have
been timed to showcase openness and transparency, a gesture meant to
impress the IMF as it considered including the yuan in the SDR.339 In
addition, by adding a lot of gold to its reserves and disclosing the latest
numbers, China demonstrated that its currency is supported by hard as-
sets340 in amounts sufficiently large for it to be deemed a big player.
However, commentators doubt the accuracy of these numbers because
information about the country’s gold holding is considered a state secret in
China,341 and because of the PBOC’s history of false reporting.342 But,
China’s covert accumulation may also make financial sense because any
large buyer may wish to disguise its intention to minimize market impact
and price hike. Moreover, China may not wish to trigger a loss of confi-
dence in dollars, due to its continuing substantial dollar holdings.343 Thus,
Chinese purchases are done through “secret agents and direct purchases
from mines,”344 many located in China and others in southern Africa and
western Australia. By 2007, China surpassed South Africa as the world’s
largest gold producer,345 mining 437 tons in 2013 alone.346 To cast one-kilo
gold bullions, gold ore from Chinese-owned mines, in and outside of
China, is transported to refineries in China, Australia, South Africa and
Switzerland and then sent to Shanghai for safekeeping, thus bypassing the
IMF’s Special Data Dissemination Standards, a method launched in 1996 and used by more
than seventy countries to provide monthly reports of gold holdings).
336. Louis Cammarosano, The Case of China’s Missing Gold, SMAULGLD (July 19,
2015), https://smaulgld.com/the-case-of-chinas-missing-gold/.
337. RICKARDS, DEATH OF MONEY, supra note 27, at 227.
338. Id.
339. China Breaks 6-Year Silence on Gold Reserves, supra note 331.
340. See Ng et al., supra note 328.
341. See As Beijing Reveals Modest Gold Hoard, Bulls Cry More, More, More,
REUTERS (July 20, 2015, 6:04 AM), http://mobile.reuters.com/article/BigStory11/idUSKCN
0PU0V220150720.
342. Chang, supra note 332.
343. Myra P. Saefong, China Finally Says How Much Gold It Has, but Nobody Believes
It, MARKETWATCH (July 17, 2015, 2:43 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/china-finally
-says-how-much-gold-it-has-but-nobody-believes-it-2015-07-17.
344. RICKARDS, DEATH OF MONEY, supra note 27, at 227.
345. Id. at 228.
346. Nat Rudarakanchana, It’s Official: China Consumed, Mined & Imported the Most
Gold Ever in 2013, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2014, 3:51 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/its-
official-china-consumed-mined-imported-most-gold-ever-2013-1556182.
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London market, “minimizing the market impact and keeping the exact
size of China’s gold hoard a state secret.”347
China is also the world’s largest consumer of gold and importer of
gold.348 Reports indicate that China has increased gold imports since 2009;
from 2010 to May 2015, it conducted its gold imports through Hong Kong,
in an amount estimated to be over 3,300 tons.349 Moreover, an undisclosed
amount is also imported through Shanghai.350 Investors have noted that
“[w]hile gold imports from Hong Kong provide a directional sense
of China’s demand, they offer incomplete data because additional ship-
ments come into China through Shanghai and Beijing as well.”351 Some
caution that government figures are misleadingly low, as China could in
fact have as much as 3,510 metric tons, or 1,850 tons more than the official
record. suggesting that China could be underreporting its gold holdings by
1,850 tons.352
If numbers from China’s own gold mining production and imports,
whether through Hong Kong or Shanghai, are not reflected in PBOC dis-
closures, where is the gold? The private sector. China has outpaced India
with private sector gold purchases accounting for 26 percent of the world’s
total gold purchases in 2013.353 The World Gold Council, the market de-
velopment organization for the gold industry, reported that by encourag-
ing “domestic absorption of gold” by the private sector . . . [,] these
‘reserves’ held by the population could always be called upon by the
state,”354 and subject to Chinese state control.
Chinese gold can also be held in a myriad of other state-owned banks
other than the PBOC, such as the Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of
China, the China Investment Corporation, a sovereign wealth fund re-
sponsible for managing the country’s foreign exchange reserves,355 and/or
the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and these holdings would
347. RICKARDS, DEATH OF MONEY, supra note 27, at 228.
348. Shu-Ching Jean Chen, China’s Secret Vaults: Where is All the Missing Gold?,
FORBES (Mar. 18, 2014, 9:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/shuchingjeanchen/2014/03/18/
chinas-secret-vaults-where-is-all-the-missing-gold/#67611da141c2.
349. Cammarosano, supra note 336.
350. Id.
351. Annie Gilroy, Shanghai Gold Exchange Withdrawals Remain Strong, YAHOO
NEWS (June 29, 2015, 12:03 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/shanghai-gold-exchange-
withdrawals-remain-150626866.html; see Jeff Clark, The Truth About China’s Massive Gold
Hoard, CASEY RESEARCH (July 22, 2014), http://www.caseyresearch.com/articles/the-truth-
about-chinas-massive-gold-hoard.
352. Chang, supra note 332; see Chen, supra note 348.
353. Heidi Malhotra, China’s Private Sector Amasses Gold, THE EPOCH TIMES (Apr. 26,
2014, 5:34 AM), http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/642362-china-s-private-sector-amasses-
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not need to be reported as part of official central bank reserves.356 When-
ever the government wishes to report a higher figure, it can do so by mov-
ing the gold into the PBOC.
The continuing importance of gold in the face of uncertainty is further
corroborated by the growing number of countries seeking to repatriate
their gold. In May 2015, Austria’s central bank announced plans to repatri-
ate £3.5 billion of its gold reserves currently stored in Britain, constituting
80% of its entire stocks after auditors warned against storing gold in a
foreign country.357 The Austrian National Bank will spend the next five
years flying gold bullions from London to Vienna, a move reminiscent of
Germany’s plan in 2013 to repatriate 300 tons of its gold stored in New
York to ensure at least 50 percent was safe in Germany by 2020.358
In November 2014, the Dutch central bank announced that it had re-
patriated 122.5 tons of gold from New York to Amsterdam, claiming the
move should “have a positive effect on public confidence.”359 Belgium too
has initiated gold repatriation,360 and a similar call to audit and repatriate
French gold back to France is also taking place.361 The rush to repatriate is
in sharp contrast with the post-World War II and Cold War days when
European countries stored their gold as far from the Communist bloc as
possible in case of a Soviet invasion. Despite the fall of the Iron Curtain,
much of European gold is has been kept in financial centers like New York
and London, as “[i]t remains the one currency that is accepted every-
where. In the event of a currency crisis, the gold could be quickly deployed
in financial markets to help restore confidence.”362 New York especially
has been a favorite because the New York Fed stores gold without charge
on the assumption that the “presence of foreign gold supports the dollar’s
status as the global reserve currency.”363
356. Ben Traynor, The Gold Price Drop Has to Do with China but Not for the Reason
You May Think, BUS. INSIDER (July 22, 2015, 8:38 AM) http://www.businessinsider.co.id/gold
-price-drop-because-of-china-and-fed-2015-7/#.VfYYl J1Viko.
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358. Id.; Clinch, Will the U.S. Give the Dutch Their Gold Back?, supra note 292 (dis-
cussing Germany’s problem getting 300 tons of its gold back from New York).
359. Vernon Silver, Where is Germany’s Gold, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 5,
2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-02-05/germany-s-gold-repatriation-ac
tivist-peter-boehringer-gets-results.
360. Germany’s Gold Repatriation Program, TOWNHALL, Apr. 12, 2016, http://townhall.
com/columnists/bgascmetals/2016/04/12/germanys-gold-repatriation-program-n2145453 (the
Central Bank of Belgium reporting in 2015 that it had repatriated 125 tons of gold from
London and announcing its goal of having half of its gold within Belgian territory).
361. Swiss, French Call to Bring Home Gold Reserves as Dutch Move 122 Tons Out of
US, RT (Nov. 28, 2014, 5:25 AM), https://www.rt.com/business/209591-gold-europe-gold-re-
patriation/; see also Alan Feuer, The Golden Age, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2014), http://mo
bile.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/sunday-review/the-golden-age.html.
362. Jack Ewing, Germany Will Cart Home Some of its Buried Treasure, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 2013.
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Interestingly, the movement to take gold back for safekeeping is led
by Northern European countries that form the core of the “haves” within
the EU.364 Again, one returns to the trust issue–that is, “building trust
with citizens frustrated by years of easy-money policies.”365 Analysts have
offered different reasons for this trend. Some explain the repatriation
frenzy as “an indication that financial Armageddon, in the guise of run-
away inflation, is approaching.”366 Others view it “as a symbolic way for
central banks and governments to make a show of strength in nervously
uncertain economic times.”367 The continuing financial crisis has height-
ened anxieties in many countries about fiat money and “the safety of their
gold reserves abroad.”368 Moreover, the financial crisis “marks a deeper
anxiety amongst tax payers and savers for the monetary system to have a
more solid base than QE (quantitative easing) and zero rates . . .”369 Gold
remains “a highly liquid asset that is easily exchanged for other curren-
cies.”370 The repatriation “is especially pronounced in Europe, where cen-
tral banks face public pressure to buy more gold or bring back home what
they hold in vaults overseas.”371
Additionally, given the financial crisis facing Greece and other Euro-
pean countries, the notion that the EU is splittable is not far–fetched,372 as
evidenced by Brexit in June 2016.373 Southern European countries such as
Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Cyprus are mired in a recession that
has required bailouts by the euro area’s northern countries, leading to pre-
diction that the euro system will be dismantled.374 Economic distress has
364. Bill Holter, Gold Repatriation and the Monetary Crisis: Austria, Belgium, and the
Netherlands Want Their Gold Back, GLOBAL RESEARCH, Dec. 17, 2014, http://www.global
research.ca/gold-repatriation-and-the-monetary-crisis-austria-belgium-and-the-netherlands-
want-their-gold-back/5420306 (discussing steps taken by the core EU countries such as Ger-
many, Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria to repatriate their gold). Note also that the EU
is located in Brussels and the European Central Bank in Frankfurt.
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TIMES (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/24/business/international/europe-
faces-three-critical-tests.html.
373. See generally Steven Erlanger, Britain Votes to Leave E.U.; Cameron Plans to Step
Down, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/25/world/europe/britain-
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brought into stark contrast the economic disparity and cultural differences
between the poorer periphery euro zone countries and the richer core
euro zone ones.375 “For the great many Germans who still rue the day
they had to trade their marks for euros, there has been at least one conso-
lation. If the common currency did not work out, Germany still had huge
reserves of the hardest currency of all: gold.”376
Moreover, the so-called Nordic bloc of countries–Germany, Belgium,
Austria, and the Netherlands–have not only the highest rated credits but
also a combined gold reserve of 4,000 tons which means “the ability to set
up a northern or ‘Nordic euro’ . . . especially if China revalues gold and
resets the world’s financial system . . . .”377 Thus, the discovery by
Germans that their gold was not physically in their own country resulted,
as discussed, in calls to repatriate it back to Germany–even as the
Bundesbank vociferously denied that repatriation reflected any lack of
trust in the New York Fed.378 Nonetheless, the fact remains that “[t]he
system, of course, is built upon trust–that the New York Fed won’t sud-
denly be taken over by people with no respect for [other] nations’ prop-
erty rights and seize it for their own use, and that the central banks won’t
lie about how much gold is in their vaults.”379
Even if some economic experts do not see “pending doom in the repa-
triation schemes and the shopping sprees by Moscow and Beijing,”380
those actions are still highly significant because they trumpet “a desire to
challenge a rival. . .”381 and in the case of the Chinese and the Russians, to
broadcast the fact “that they’re unhappy with the dollar or that they want
to become a global player . . . .”382
CONCLUSION
The dollar’s exorbitant privilege is being challenged by allies and ri-
vals alike. Like his predecessor Charles De Gaulle, who was resentful of
the dollar’s unique status, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy pro-
claimed in the midst of the 2008 financial crisis that, “We need a new Bret-
ton Woods We can’t have on the one hand a multipolar world and on the
375. See, e.g., Alan Greenspan, Europe’s Crisis is All About the North-South Split, FIN.
TIMES (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/678b163a-ef68-11e0-bc88-00144feab49a.html
#axzz4JWuMqXY1; Derek Scally, New Party Wants to Split Euro Into Blocs, IRISH TIMES
(Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/new-party-wants-to-split-euro-into-
blocs-1.1778115.
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2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/01/16/why-germany-wants-its-
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380. Feuer, supra note 361.
381. Id.
382. Id. (quoting Joshua Aizenman, Professor of Economics and International Rela-
tions at the University of Southern California).
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other a single reserve currency on a global level.”383 As noted, China has
called for a reserve currency that is not issued by any one country.384 Rus-
sia too has denounced the continued use of the dollar as a reserve cur-
rency issued, ironically, by a debtor (albeit hegemonic) country: “one
center of consumption, which is financed by deficit, and correspondingly,
an accumulation of debt, one reserve currency that is powerful as never
before, and one predominating system of evaluating risks and assets.”385
A few scholarly commentators have issued warnings about the likely
consequences of dollar decline from singular currency to one among
many, or from top currency to “negotiated” currency.386 As some scholars
have observed,
[t]he relative diminution of the dollar as an international currency
to something like first-among-equals status will not only cause the
United States to lose privileges it once enjoyed—its coercive
power enhanced by greater autonomy and its structural power im-
plicitly shaping the preferences of others—but it will also produce
new burdens, which Americans will be singularly unaccustomed to
bearing.387
The ripple effect will likely be felt in myriad ways in different areas of
U.S. interests, including economic, political and security interests. The fol-
lowing observation accurately reflects what I have described throughout
the article:
[A] shift away from the dollar as a reserve currency and pricing
standard for oil transactions, could be catastrophic for the United
States. In the worst case scenario, a drastic drop in demand for
dollar-denominated assets would cause the interest rates on Trea-
sury Securities to skyrocket, sending ripples through the US econ-
omy as the value of the dollar plummets. . . . [The] . . . decrease in
demand for US debt . . . will constrain the federal government’s
ability to spend and the ability of the United States to defend it-
self. The United States has built its foreign policy around its vast
military capability; a sudden budgetary shock and drop in military
383. Katrin Bennhold, At Davos, Sarkozy Calls for Global Finance Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/28/business/global/28davos.html.
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online.wsj.com/articles/SB123780272456212885 (“Because other nations continued to park
their money in U.S. dollars, the argument goes, the Federal Reserve was able to pursue an
irresponsible policy in recent years, keeping interest rates too low for too long and thereby
helping to inflate a bubble in the housing market.”).
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2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/06/business/global/06ruble.html.
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spending would leave the United States vulnerable as it scrambles
to regroup in a new security environment.388
This Article has traced the evolution of the dollar and shown how it
evolved from its origin in coins of gold and silver to paper “greenbacks”
backed by gold to its current state–fiat money unbacked by anything of
intrinsic value and issued by a debtor, albeit powerful, country. As late as
the 1980s, the United States was “the world’s largest creditor and source
of investment money”389 but “[b]y 2000, America’s net foreign liabilities
had become larger than those of all other debtor countries com-
bined. . . .”390 In its current incarnation, the dollar is most vulnerable to
challenge–internal because of chronic deficits and external because of in-
ternational rivalries and intense dissatisfaction with how the United States
has managed the dollar and the effect this has created on the rest of the
world. Indeed, the IMF itself issued a report warning that the staggering
increase in U.S. foreign debt is a hazard to the global economy and “could
play havoc with the value of the dollar and international exchange
rates.”391
The dollar may be strong this year or weak last year. That is the nature
of a market-based floating system. But, regardless of any momentary snap-
shot, various indicators show that an alternative, non-dollar system is be-
ing slowly but surely created. The Triffin Dilemma,392 combined with the
global economic crisis of 2008, has triggered heated debate about the in-
ternational monetary system, and because the dollar is at the centerpiece
of this system, about the dollar itself. Different proposals have been put
forth by governments, quasi-governmental bodies, government officials,
and others to correct imbalances specifically in the dollar-based interna-
tional economic system393 and more generally in the international eco-
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SYSTEM, A CHATHAM HOUSE REPORT, at ix (Paola Subacchi & John Driffil eds., 2010) (pro-
posing a “multicurrency reserve system . . . alongside a still preeminent dollar”); Bennhold,
supra note 383 (calling for a single reserve currency untied to any one country); Xiaochuan,
supra note 39 (favoring first a super-sovereign reserve currency, but proposing as second-best
a greater role for the IMF’s SDR because it has “the features and potential to act as a super-
sovereign reserve currency”); McKinsey Global Institute, An Exorbitant Privilege? Implica-
tions of Reserve Currencies for Competitiveness 38 (Discussion Paper, Dec. 2009) (propos-
ing a greater role for SDRs through new rules permitting the private sector to issue its own
SDR instruments.); U.N. Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its
Impact on Development, June 24-26, 2009, Report of the Commission of Experts of the Presi-
dent of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and
Financial System, at 98, 117 (rejecting a multi-currency reserve system and supporting a
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nomic legal framework itself.394 This Article has not focused on the many
theoretical or policy proposals that have sprouted post-2008 because its
emphasis is on concrete developments395 and concerted actions that have
already been undertaken to undermine dollar hegemony.
If Triffin’s observations are taken to their logical conclusion, “[t]he
endgame to Triffin’s paradox is a global, wholesale dumping of the center
country’s securities. No one knows in advance when the tipping point will
be reached, but the damage brought about by higher interest rates and
slower economic growth will be readily apparent afterward.”396 At the
height of the 2008 financial crisis, Luo Ping, a director-general at the
China Banking Regulatory Commission, agonized thus: “Except for U.S.
Treasuries, what can you hold? Gold? . . . U.S. Treasuries are the safe
haven. For everyone, including China, it is the only option . . . We know
the dollar is going to depreciate, so we hate you guys, but there is nothing
much we can do.”397 Undoubtedly, pressure on the dollar is continuing
and cracks are increasingly apparent. Possibilities abound—instead of the
dollar as the singular hegemonic currency, we could have regional curren-
cies instead.398 Emerging markets, whether BRICS or some other combi-
nation, could establish competitive currency zones.399 “[S]udden reserve
diversification, or the act of foreign governments abruptly shifting their
“truly global reserve currency” in which countries agree to exchange their own currencies for
a new currency called “International Currency Certificates,” which cannot be held in exces-
sive quantities to facilitate adjustment between deficit and surplus countries). For a summary
of other proposals, see Emily Merki, Why the Dollar Should No Longer Be the World Reserve
Currency: Solving Global Account Imbalances Through Structural Reform, 46 GEO. J. INT’L
L. 1245, 1253-70 (2015) (discussing myriad reforms–international harmonization of bank cap-
ital requirements; increasing supervision of international capital movement; minimization of
instability caused by massive accumulation of dollars through exchange rate adjustments;
multi-currency reserve system; creation of a freestanding reserve currency backed by gold).
394. See, e.g., Discovering Great Opportunity in the Midst of Great Crisis: Building In-
ternational Legal Frameworks for a Higher Standard of Living, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 147
(2010).
395. As an example of rare legal scholarship on the dollar as world reserve currency,
see Wu, supra note 266, at 14 (ascribing the following as reasons for dollar decline: “the
unwillingness of others to hold it as a reserve currency, balance of payment deficits, the drop
in American gold holdings in relationship to the growing foreign-held dollars, and the mas-
sive transnational movement of capital”).
396. Francis E. Warnock, How Dangerous Is U.S. Government Debt?, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. at 112 (June 2010), http://www.cfr.org/financial-crises/dangerous-us-govern
ment-debt/p22408.
397. Id. In May 2009 on a visit to China, Brazil’s then-president, Luiz Inácio Lula da
Silva, echoed Chinese frustration and called the world to “stop denominating trade in dol-
lars.” Id.
398. Zanny Minton Beddoes, From Emu to Amu? The Case For Regional Currencies,
FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 1999, at 8 (comparing European monetary union and U.S. mone-
tary union).
399. Wu, supra note 266, at 29-34 (describing the possibility and viability of Big Emerg-
ing Markets (“BEM”) consisting of Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Poland, Turkey,
India, Indonesia, China, and South Korea forming a monetary union, the BEMU).
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funds from dollars to other currencies”400 is not farfetched. That disaster
did not strike even after the 2008 financial crisis does not mean it will not
ever strike. That there is, as of yet, no effective alternative to the dollar401
does not mean that one will not emerge. Indeed, it is reasonable to note
that it is the “Eurozone phase of the global financial crisis . . . [that] . . . has
provided the U.S. government with a timely respite from both domestic
forces and Triffin’s endgame”402 and that what the United States got as a
result was merely “a lucky break.”403
As George Soros succinctly described, “in the financial sphere the
Bretton Woods institutions—the IMF and the World Bank—have lost
their monopoly position. Under Chinese leadership, a parallel set of insti-
tutions is emerging.”404 Soros noted that against this context of “rival
camps” with China and Russia on one side and the United States on the
other, “China has begun to build a parallel set of financial institutions,
including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB); the Asian
Bond Fund Initiative; the New Development Bank (formerly the BRICS
Bank); and the Chiang Mai Initiative, which is an Asian regional multilat-
eral arrangement to swap currencies.”405 I have focused on the New De-
velopment Bank and on a myriad of other actions, from the various China-
Russia bilateral agreements, the historic gas deal, to demonstrate that the
hegemony of the dollar is being eroded as more and more countries seek
to price oil and gas in a currency other than the dollar, such as the yuan.
Since the closure of the gold window, the dollar’s unique status has been
maintained partly by its linkage to oil. Breaking the dollar-oil link will be a
significant step toward bringing the world closer to a non-dollar-based re-
gime. Hence, it is interesting to note that whereas Saddam Hussein moved
to price oil in a currency other than the U.S. dollar,406 Iraq post-Saddam
Hussein is now committed to selling oil in dollars.407
400. Warnock, supra note 396, at 1-2.
401. See ESWAR PRASAD, THE DOLLAR TRAP: HOW THE U.S. DOLLAR TIGHTENED ITS
GRIP ON GLOBAL FINANCE (2014); see also Benjamin J. Cohen & Tabitha M. Benney, What
Does the International Currency System Really Look Like, 20 REV. INT’L POL. ECON., 1017,
1017-41 (2013) (arguing that despite the rise of a multipolar system, U.S. centrality contin-
ues); Doug Stokes, Achilles’ Deal: Dollar Decline and US Grand Strategy After the Crisis, 21
REV. INT’L POL. ECON., 1071, 1071-94 (2014).
402. Warnock, supra note 396.
403. Id.
404. George Soros, A Partnership with China to Avoid World War, THE N.Y. REVIEW
(July 9, 2015), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2015/jul/09/partnership-china-avoid-
world-war/.
405. Id.
406. See supra notes 276-278.
407. The current Iraqi Dinar exchange rate is now pegged to the U.S. dollar. IMF, Iraq
Staff-Monitored Program–Press Release; and Staff Report, Attachment I Memorandum on
Economic and Financial Policies, ¶ 19 (2016) (“The government will maintain the Iraqi Di-
nar’s peg to the U.S. dollar. The peg provides a key nominal anchor in a highly uncertain
environment with policy capacity weakened by the conflict with ISIS.”); see Ministry of Oil,
Mechanisms of Contracting and Executing Crude Oil Export Agreements, OIL MARKETING
COMPANY (2015), http://somooil.gov.iq/en/ (“As from the B/L date, and after elapsing of the
Fall 2016] Currency Wars 117
The search for hard assets such as oil, gas, gold and other natural re-
sources has also intensified. Gold in particular remains relevant to the in-
ternational economy, despite vociferous claims to the contrary. It remains
relevant despite prior efforts to demote it. Take as an example the move
by the IMF in January 1976 to convert the SDR “from a gold-backed re-
serve asset to one referencing a basket of paper currencies.”408 Take as
another example the deliberate effort by the United States during the
Carter administration to lower the price of gold by dumping 300 tons of it
onto the international market.409 to show that dollars, rather than gold,
should be the global reserve currency. China’s quest to internationalize
the yuan and its recent inclusion in the IMF’s SDR basket reflect not only
Chinese desire “to use financial liberalization as an engine of growth” but
also its “ultimate ambition of replacing the US dollar as the dominant cur-
rency in the world.”410 It is not only China but Russia as well that has
stepped up efforts to increase its own gold reserves. From 2004 to 2013,
Russian reserves increased from 390 tons to over 1,000 tons.411
Through QE, massive printing of dollars has upset the complex rela-
tionship between the dollar and other currencies tied to it, such as the
yuan. Dollar devaluation has resulted in inflation in other countries, con-
tributing to economic stress and political revolutions in many parts of the
world. Moreover, the drive to repatriate gold in the post-2008-financial
crisis world must be seen in this context–of growing mistrust in the global
financial system, in the same way that mistrust during the Cold War drove
Germany and other European countries to keep its gold stored in New
York rather than risk confiscation by the Soviets on the other side of the
Iron Curtain. “If the United States or the U.K. suddenly deemed it neces-
sary to confiscate foreign gold to defend its paper currency in a crisis, that
gold would be conveyed from the original owners to the possession of the
United States or the U.K.”412
contractually specified period, SOMO calculates and notifies the respective client company
of the final unit price of the cargo (i.e. U.S. Dollar per Barrel).”); Emily Glazer, Nour Malas
& Jon Hilsenrath, U.S. Cut Iraq Cash on Iran, ISIS Fears, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2015, at A1
(“Since the U.S. overthrew Saddam Hussein and helped establish the Central Bank of Iraq in
2004, the U.S. dollar has largely become the country’s chief currency because so much of the
economy runs on cash. When Iraq needs more paper currency, the money is drawn from the
country’s account at the Fed, funded largely by oil reserves, and flown to Baghdad.”); Carola
Hoyos & Kevin Morrison, Iraq Steps Back into Oil Market with Crude Sale Offer, FIN. TIMES,
June 6, 2003, at 11 (describing the post-Saddam Iraq offering of oil which “switches the trans-
action back to dollars–the international currency of oil sales–despite the greenback’s recent
fall in value. Saddam Hussein in 2000 insisted Iraq’s oil be sold for euros, a political move,
but one that improved Iraq’s recent earnings thanks to the rise of the euro against the
dollar”).
408. RICKARDS, DEATH OF MONEY, supra note 27, at 235.
409. Id.
410. Soros, supra note 404.
411. RICKARDS, DEATH OF MONEY, supra note 27, at 229.
412. Id. at 231.
118 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 38:57
As there is mistrust in paper money such as the dollar, there is an
increasing demand to accumulate gold as a reserve asset. As Mario
Draghi, head of the European Central Bank declared in 2013, “I never
thought it wise to sell [gold] because for central banks this is a reserve of
safety. It’s viewed by the country as such. In the case of non-dollar coun-
tries, it gives you a fairly good protection against fluctuations of the dol-
lar.”413 This Article has connected seemingly disparate dots in the
international economic system to warn about the dangers that lie beneath
the dollar’s apparent strength. Before any serious efforts to defend the
system can be mustered,414 the first task is to realize that positive snap-
shots, a rallying stock market, a strong dollar, a robust economic recovery,
or a slowdown in China’s economy415 may in fact be deceiving because
what lies beneath are fault lines that pose fundamental danger to the post-
World War II international economic regime.
413. Id. at 236.
414. Common sense suggestions have been put forth. See, e.g., Warnock, supra note 396
(suggesting that preserving dollar hegemony means bold fiscal adjustments to end “persistent
borrowing from abroad. . . [to finance] persistent increases in government and household
consumption”). Some have focused on reforming the international financial system through
regulatory mechanisms to manage systemic risks. See generally Yesha Yadav, The Specter of
Sisyphus: Re-making International Financial Regulation After the Global Financial Crisis, 24
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 83 (2010). Others have proposed a more coordinated international
response, focusing on “comprehensive exchange rate adjustments that would limit the desta-
bilizing effect that accumulation of massive reserves in one currency has produced.” Juscelino
F. Colares, Global Imbalances and Liquidity-Induced Bubbles: Reflections on the Great Re-
cession and the Need for International Monetary Reform, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 603, 605
(2010).
415. Since Russia and China signed the gas pipeline deal in 2014, the Chinese economy
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Gazprom’s China Contract Offers No Protection Against Low Prices, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 10,
2016), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4ac1cdd6-3f79-11e5-9abe-5b335da3a90e.html#axzz4JrCWy
URN; Michael Lelyveld, Russia Presses China for New Gas Deal, RADIO FREE ASIA (Aug.
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